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Preface
European integration evolves. Markets become more integrated, businesses are increasingly
operating internationally and capital mobility is growing. This process is accommodated by
developments in European policy such as the creation of an internal market, centralisation of
monetary policy, and coordination of economic policies by means of guidelines, information
exchange and peer pressure. Economic policies not only accommodate but also respond to
increasing market integration: competition policy has partly been moved to a central European
level while individual governments increasingly compete with their institutions for
internationally footloose capital.
CPBs unit on European Comparative Analysis conducts research projects on the interaction
between market integration in Europe and the coordination of economic policies. In the
underlying report, the focus is on tax policies. The main question is whether tax coordination
should be the next step in the European integration process as a response to the increasing
integration of markets. To answer this question, the authors bring together the economic
literature on tax competition, an analysis of trends in capital income tax systems, and an
overview of the European policy discussion on tax coordination. In this way, they provide a guide
to the debate and aim to help policy makers in structuring their ideas and in clarifying the
choices they face.
The study was conducted by Joeri Gorter and Ruud de Mooij, both from the European
Comparative Analysis unit at CPB. They thank Lans Bovenberg for fruitful discussions during
the course of this project. They also benefited from helpful comments on earlier drafts by
Casper van Ewijk, George Gelauff and Jan Koeman. Kathy Schuitemaker was very helpful in
finalizing the report.
Henk Don
Director, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy AnalysisPreface Capital income taxation in EuropeIntroduction
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1 Introduction
To what extent does internationalisation of business trigger reforms in European capital income
tax systems and vice versa? Would tax coordination among European countries be an
appropriate response to internationalisation? And if it is, how should member states go about
doing it? This study elaborates on these and other issues in the context of capital income
taxation in the European Union.
It is by now a commonplace to state that capital markets integrate, especially in the European
Union (EU). Indeed, portfolios become more international, cross border mergers are daily
business, and never before has there been so much foreign direct investment. The creation of
the internal market for financial services and the completion of EMU amplify this trend.
Capital market integration has important implications for capital income taxation. For
instance, it raises compliance costs for both multinational corporations and governments: in the
EU, the first now have to deal with fifteen distinct tax administrations and their complex
interactions; the latter face the difficult task to monitor international capital income. Moreover,
internationalisation increases the opportunities for profit shifting by multinationals, thereby
threatening the budget in high-tax countries. And last but not least, capital market integration
intensifies tax competition among governments: it prompts governments to set low effective tax
rates in order to lure internationally mobile capital.
Capital market integration has thus not only provoked national tax reform, but has also
kicked up dust in the EU policy debate on tax coordination. This debate is not new. Already in
1975, the European Commission (EC) proposed minimum and maximum corporate income tax
rates in the EU. Member states brushed this proposal aside by arguing that harmonisation of tax
rates is meaningless without a harmonisation of tax bases. In 1988, the EC launched a draft
proposal for harmonisation of tax bases while a report by the Ruding Committee in 1992 on
company taxes suggested steps towards harmonisation of both tax bases and tax rates. Again,
these proposals did not gain approval. Recently, the EU laid down a code of conduct with respect
to harmful tax practices. This approach has been more successful: in 1997, member states
committed themselves to the code; in 1999 the Primarolo working group blacklisted a number
of harmful tax practices, resulting in peer pressure among member states to discard these
practices. Nevertheless, the code is non-binding and narrow in scope. This raises questions:
should Europe go beyond the code? And if so, what would be a fruitful direction for tax
coordination?
Pleas for tax coordination usually originate in inefficiencies associated with tax competition.
In particular, the main tenet of tax competition theory is that it prompts governments to set
inefficiently low tax rates on internationally mobile capital. The result of this fiscal externality
would be either inefficiently low levels of public good provision, or inefficiently high tax rates on
less mobile production factors such as labour. The central tenet of a different strand of literatureIntroduction Capital income taxation in Europe
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is, however, that tax competition is an effective means to discipline governments which have a
natural tendency to set too high tax rates. Thus, a trade-off exists between the fiscal externality of
tax competition and the alleviation of government failures: solving the first problem aggravates
the second, and vice versa. 
Where do we currently stand on this trade-off? The present state of tax coordination is
minimal: it only entails a few directives and a non-binding code of conduct. This suggests that a
(marginal) increase of tax coordination is likely to be a move towards the optimal mix of tax
competition and tax coordination.
Still, it is by no means obvious how member states should go about coordinating their tax
codes. This is due to another trade-off: coordination of tax codes puts a backstop on tax
competition, but infringes upon the diversity in tax systems. This latter entails a cost because
countries can no longer pursue the policies that best reflect the preference of their citizens. Less
far reaching proposals for tax coordination respect tax diversity, but fail to alleviate most of the
negative externalities associated with tax competition. There are, moreover, subtle trade-offs in
the design of tax coordination related to the to the simplicity of taxation, to the incentives to
compete for real investments, and to the scope for profit shifting. This study aims to clarify
these trade-offs so that policy makers are better informed in making their decisions.
1.1 Main findings of the study
The study contains four main building blocks, presented in four chapters. First, it contains an
European comparative analysis of the systems and levels of capital income taxation, primarily
from a national point of view. Second, the study explores the tax treatment of international
capital flows in Europe and the behavioural responses to these taxes. Third, we examine how
governments respond to each other in a world of internationally mobile capital. Finally, the
study contains an assessment of a number of proposals for tax coordination.
In chapter 2 we elaborate on the differences in capital income tax systems in the EU and
their development during the last decade. We draw three conclusions from this analysis. First,
capital tax rates in Europe have decreased: tax rates on interest, dividend, and retained profit
have unambiguously declined, both due to lower statutory corporate tax rates and lower personal
tax rates on capital income. Secondly, capital income tax systems have not converged. Indeed, we
find that capital tax systems have become more dissimilar in their mix of taxation of interest,
dividend, and retained profit. Thirdly, capital income taxation has become less neutral. This is
because the undertaxation of interest relative to dividend and retained profit has not been
resolved. In addition, the undertaxation of retained profit relative to dividend has become more
pronounced. 
Chapter 2 also analyses the development in effective tax rates in Europe. We stress that
effective tax rates should be interpreted with care. The reason is that different calculationIntroduction
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methods exist, all with their own merits and demerits and all with different conclusions. Our
conclusion is that the main use of effective tax rates lies not in cross-country comparison, but in
inferring trends. In analysing these trends we find that, unlike the statutory tax rates, effective
capital income tax rates have remained constant in Europe during the last decade. Indeed, the
decrease in statutory rates has been accompanied by a broadening of tax bases.
In chapter 3 we focus on the taxation of international capital flows, primarily corporate
income taxation. On the basis of recent literature, we conclude that effective corporate taxes have
a significant impact on the international allocation of investments. Furthermore, cross-country
differences in statutory tax rates are found to have important implications for the distribution of
corporate profits across affiliates in various countries. This profit shifting intensifies in light of
the internationalisation of business, the growing importance of intangible investments and the
rise in intra-company trade.
In chapter 4 we elaborate on tax competition. Strategic tax setting behaviour by individual
governments leads to several inefficiencies associated with fiscal spillovers. These reflect some
kind of market failure in the context of competition among governments and provide a case for
tax coordination. This case, however, should be qualified. Tax competition can be welfare
improving to the extent that it exerts a positive impact on the efficiency of government policies.
Moreover, model simulations suggest that the welfare effects from tax coordination will be
unequally distributed, both over countries and over interest groups within countries. For
instance, large countries and poor residents tend to benefit more from tax coordination than
small countries and rich residents, if the latter gain at all. This uneven distribution may impede
the implementation of tax coordination. Consequently, the case for tax coordination is more
subtle than a first glance at fiscal spillovers would suggest.
In chapter 5 we discuss several forms of tax coordination that go beyond the current state of
affairs. All proposals infringe upon the sovereignty of member states. However, the way in
which they do differs markedly. Proposals impact differently upon administrative and
compliance cost, the fiscal spillovers associated with tax competition, and the distortionary
impact of tax differentials for the international allocation of resources. The trade-offs in capital
income taxation imply that if a proposal does well on one score, it tends to do worse on another.
Therefore, it is impossible to proclaim a winning proposal.
Our analysis suggest that tax base harmonisation will typically improve neutrality and
simplicity. However, it does not reduce the opportunities for profit shifting, unless formula
apportionment is introduced. Formula apportionment and harmonisation of statutory tax rates
eliminate profit shifting, but hardly improve upon simplicity. A minimum effective tax rate, to
some extent, respects the fiscal sovereignty of member states, and reduces the possibilities for
tax competition and profit shifting. This proposal increases, however, the administrative burden
of taxation.  A full harmonisation of tax rates and bases outperforms all other proposals on
neutrality, fiscal spillovers, and simplicity. A European corporate income tax is most attractive inIntroduction Capital income taxation in Europe
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these respects. It yields economies of scale in tax collection and it avoids the political, technical
and economic problems associated with formula apportionment and separate accounting.
However, one has to accept that one size fits all infringes most upon diversity. Capital income taxation in the eu
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2 Capital income taxation in the EU
Countries differ substantially in the way and the level at which they tax capital income. These
differences originate in historical developments in economic, legal and social structures,
different political traditions, country size, the desirable size of the public sector, and the
acceptability and feasibility of various taxes. This chapter sheds light on the differences in capital
income taxation in the European Union. We explore also the developments in these taxes during
the last decade. 
2.1 Capital income tax systems 
A glance at tax codes of EU countries reveals an array of distinct taxes: there are corporate
income taxes, net worth taxes, corporate real estate taxes, payroll taxes, corporate social security
contributions, withholding taxes on dividend, interest, and royalties, value added taxes, personal
income taxes, wages taxes, capital gains taxes, net wealth taxes, personal real estate taxes,
personal social security contributions, inheritance and gift taxes, and more. Which ones are
capital income taxes? Moreover, countries operate split rate, dual and imputation systems in
which corporate and personal income taxes interact. How does this impact upon capital income
taxation? Clearly, a simplifying model is needed.
2.1.1 A simplified framework
A convenient starting point is the system of national accounts (Sinn, 1987). Its basic relation is
the identity 'net national product equals net national income'
where  denotes gross national product,   the depreciation rate,  the capital stock,   the 
wage rate,   employment,   the interest rate,   the stock of outstanding debt, and   profit. $
This profit comprises three elements: the normal return to capital (equal to the interest rate), a
risk premium, and an economic rent. Profits can be decomposed into distributed profit (or
dividend)  , and retained profit  . The terms on the right hand side of identity (2.1) $ $ 	 $
correspond, in addition to labour income  , to the capital income categories interest  ,
dividend   , and retained profit  . Taxes on these capital income categories are capital $ $ 	 $
income taxes.
Companies can be divided into incorporated and unincorporated businesses. The latter are
usually taxed under the personal income tax. In this book, we concentrate on the taxation ofCapital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
1 Germany is about to discard the split rate tax system.
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capital income generated by corporate businesses. In that case, the total tax burdens on interest,
dividend, and retained profit equal
and
where   denotes the personal income tax rate on interest,   the corporate and   the personal - - -
tax rate on dividend,   the corporate income tax rate on retained profit, and   the personal - -
income tax rate on capital gains. It may be noted that interest escapes corporate income taxation
due to its deductibility from the corporate income tax base. There is, however, economic double
taxation of dividend and retained profit. The first terms of expressions (2.3) and (2.4) refer to
the corporate, the second terms to the personal income tax burden. The economic double
taxation of dividend is salient: it constitutes taxable corporate as well as taxable personal income.
The economic double taxation of retained profit is more subtle: it constitutes taxable corporate
income, and induces a proportionate appreciation of outstanding stocks. This appreciation is
subsequently taxed through the personal capital gains tax (if applicable in a country).
2.1.2 Integration systems 
Relief for economic double taxation is, perhaps because of its salience, focussed on dividend.
Various relief systems or integration systems coexist. We sum them up with help of the tax
rates defined above. Germany has a split rate system. It sets a relatively low corporate income tax
rate on dividend, i.e. 
1. France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK have imputation - -
systems. These countries impute a proportion   of net dividend as a tax credit to individual 
shareholders. It seems more natural to impute a proportion of the corporate income tax on
dividend (as done in Portugal and Denmark). This does, however, come down to the same thing.
The effective personal income tax rate on dividend changes according to the equation
. The first term on the right hand side corresponds to the personal income -
 
 -  -  	 
tax rate on dividend; the second term to the practice that the tax credit constitutes taxableCapital income taxation in the eu
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personal income; the third term to the tax credit itself. It may be noted that the inequality
 holds for all parameter configurations that make economic sense. Thus, imputation -
  -
always leads to a reduction of total tax burden on dividend. This burden becomes
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden have a classical system. They do
not set reduced tax rates on dividend, nor do they impute net dividend to individual
shareholders. The Netherlands, however, replaced its personal income tax on interest and
dividend by a net wealth tax in 2001 (see box).
Note that relief systems are not mutually exclusive. For instance, Germany combines the
imputation system with the split rate system. Finland, among other countries, combines the
imputation system with a dual tax system: it sets a relatively low personal income tax rate on
dividend, i.e.  , where  denotes the personal income tax rate on labour income.  - - -
Relief for double taxation of retained profit is less common. Nevertheless, some countries do
set relatively low capital gains tax rates. Often a distinction is made between speculative and non
speculative capital gains by tracking the number of years shares are being held by individual
shareholders. A few countries completely exempt capital gains.
Dutch tax reform in 2001 and neutrality of capital income taxation
In January 2001, the Netherlands have replaced the comprehensive personal income tax on interest and dividends
by a schedular tax of 30% on a presumptive return of 4%. This tax boils down to a net wealth tax of 1.2%. Bovenberg
and Ter Rele (1998) have explored the implications of this reform for the incentives to save and invest, using the
methodology developed by King and Fullerton (1984). 
Their results suggest that the reform has a number of  implications for the neutrality of taxation. First, by lowering
the marginal tax burden on capital at the personal level, it reduces the relative tax advantage of tax exempt
institutional savings (like pension savings). Secondly, the reform causes less distortions in the choice between
financing investment through retained earnings and new equity. This is because, unlike the previous tax system
which leaves capital gains untaxed, the new system applies a uniform personal tax rate on interest, dividend and
capital gains. By alleviating the tax-favoured treatment of capital gains, this also alleviates the favourable tax
treatment of saving through funds that generate only capital gains. Finally, the reform intensifies the discrimination
of debt finance over equity finance since it eliminates the tax advantage of capital gains at the personal level. Hence,
it will probably aggravate the problem of thin capitalization.Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
2 Here, we focus on domestic investors who invest in domestic firms. For foreign investments, the distinction






2.1.3 A characterization of tax systems
Now we have derived expressions for the tax burdens on interest, dividend, and retained profit,
we are in the position to present our model of capital income taxation. By dividing the tax
burdens (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) by, respectively  ,  , and  , we arrive at a vector of three $ $ 	 $
total tax rates on interest, dividend, and retained profit
where the equation  corresponds to the total tax rate on dividend, -
 
 -  -
 	 - -

and  to the total tax rate on retained profit. The first terms on the right hand -
 
 -  - 	 - -
sides of the equations refer to corporate income taxation, the second to personal income
taxation, and the third to the reduction of the personal income tax base due to integration relief.
The rationale behind this model is that capital owners should not be interested in corporate and
personal income tax rates separately, but rather in how they interplay to determine the total wide
tax rate, that is, in the proportion of gross capital income that ends up in the treasurys coffers.
2
Sinn (1987) provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for the model by demonstrating that
within a dynamic general equilibrium framework only these rates directly impact upon the
financing and investment behaviour of the representative capital owner. Admittedly, tax rates
that directly apply to capital stock, such as net worth and net wealth tax rates, should also matter.
They are, however, insignificant from the perspective of tax revenue (except for the Netherlands
after 2001). We will come back to the impact of taxes on investment behaviour at the end of this
chapter.
2.2 Developments of capital income taxation 
What are the recent developments of EU capital income tax systems  ? Our international - -
 -

comparison comprises three questions: (1) have capital income tax rates decreased, (2) have
capital income tax systems converged, and (3) is there a trend towards neutrality?
Table 2.1 lists the capital income tax systems of all EU countries for 1990 and 2000. Details
from the tax codes of corporate and personal income tax rates that constitute the basic building
blocks of the capital income tax systems have been relegated to the appendix to this chapter.
Before discussing the figures in table 2.1, a few remarks are necessary. First, the figures refer to
tax rates set by the central government, exclusive of local taxes. These local taxes are quite
important in some countries, for instance in Germany (the Gewerbesteur). Given the complexityCapital income taxation in the eu
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of local taxes and their interactions with federal corporate taxes, however, we decided to exclude
them from our table. Secondly, table 2.1 ignores surtaxes. A surtax is a tax on corporate tax
(rather than on corporate income) and is often imposed as a temporary measure. Thirdly, we do
not take account of graduated tax structures but instead report the top marginal tax rate on
corporate profits. Some countries, such as the UK, set a relatively low tax rate on small
businesses. Finally, we take no account of the special corporate tax rates to different types of
businesses. For instance, Ireland adopts a special 10% tax rate for income from manufacturing
and companies in the financial centre of Dublin. The appendix does describe the various
country-specific elements in corporate tax systems in Europe.
Table 2.1 reveals that the total tax burden on interest ranges from a low of 25% (Belgium and
Sweden) to a high of 60% (Netherlands) in 1990, and a low of 15% (Denmark and Greece) to a
high of 60% (Netherlands) in 2000. The tax rate on dividend ranges from 29% (Finland) to
74% (The Netherlands) in 1990 and 2000. The width of the range is predominantly caused by
differences in capital tax systems, not by differences in headline rates. In particular, Finland has
a full imputation system, where all corporate income tax can be credited against personal
income tax liability, whereas the Netherlands has a classical system, where no double taxation
relief is given. The tax rate on retained profits ranges from 41% (Belgium) to 77% (Germany) in
1990, and from 32% (Denmark) to 71% (Germany) in 2000. The width of the range is
predominantly caused by differences in tax bases, again not by differences in headline rates.
Table 2.1 Total tax rate on dividend, retained profit, and interest, EU 1990/2000
           interest (-p)            dividend (-d
*)         retained profits (-r
*)
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Austria 50 25 48 51 65 34
Belgium 25 55 56 73 41 39
Denmark 40 15 55 59 64 32
Finland 30 29 29 29 57 50
France 57 54 59 54 73 69
Germany 53 51 53 51 77 71
Great Britain 40 40 48 48 61 58
Greece 50 15 46 40 73 67
Ireland 56 24 46 59 77 39
Italy 50 27 58 46 68 65
Luxemburg 56 46 71 46 71 62
Netherlands 60 60 74 74 35 35
Portugal 40 40 58 48 43 39
Spain 56 40 74 45 74 61
Sweden 25 30 55 50 55 50
Mean 45.9 36.7 55.3 51.5 62.3 51.4
Standard deviation 11.8 14.5 11.8 11.5 13.6 14.1
Source: IBFD (2000)Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
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Belgium and Denmark exempt capital gains from personal income taxation, whereas Germany
taxes them fully. It should, however, be noted that the Danish tax rate is somewhat biased since
local tax rates, not included in table 2.1, constitute a relatively important part of the Danish tax
system (see appendix).
2.2.1 Have tax rates declined?
From table 2.1 is immediately apparent that tax rates have unambiguously decreased over the
past decade: the mean tax rates on interest, dividend, and retained profit have changed from
46% to 37%, from 55% to 52%, and from 62% to 51%. The t-statistics of the tests for two
population means with paired comparisons are -2.1, -1.2, and -3.4 for interest, dividend, and
retained profit. Thus, the decrease is statistically significant for interest, and retained profit,
albeit not for dividend. The mean tax rate on interest has decreased because Austria, Greece, and
Ireland have replaced taxation of interest through the personal income tax by a final withholding
tax with a significantly lower rate. But also the tax rates in Denmark, Italy and Spain fell by more
than 10%-points. The mean tax rate on retained profit has decreased for the same reason, but
even more because Austria, Denmark, and Ireland have expelled capital gains from the personal
income tax base. In chapter 4 we will discuss what may have prompted these countries to do so.
At this stage we merely stress that the first stylised fact from the international comparison is a
clear decrease in capital income tax rates. As becomes apparent from the appendix, this is due to
both lower corporate income tax rates and lower personal income tax rates.
2.2.2 Have tax systems converged?
Table 2.1 shows an increase in the standard deviations of tax rates on retained profit and
interest. This does not mean, however, that capital tax systems have diverged. The reason is that
row observations are paired because they belong to the same country. It is conceivable that, even
though the variation of capital taxes have increased, capital tax systems have converged. Thus, in
order to verify whether EU integration in the last decade has induced convergence, a slightly
more complicated analysis is necessary.
Systems of capital taxation can be represented by points in the three dimensional space
spanned by the tax rates on dividend, retained profits, and interest. For example, the Dutch
system of capital taxation can be represented by the point (60, 74, 35), where the coordinates
refer to the Dutch total tax rates on interest, dividend, and retained profits. The set of EU
systems is then a scatter of fifteen points. If the points are closely bunched around the scatters
centre of gravity then EU systems of capital taxation are alike; if the points are jumbled across
space then EU systems of capital taxation are unalike. The mean distance from the centre of
gravity measures the degree to which capital tax systems are alike. Hence, it is a dissimilarity
indicator. If it decreases, capital tax systems converge; if it increases, capital tax systems diverge.
It is easy to verify that its 1990 value is 18.9 and its 2000 value 20.8. The reason for thisCapital income taxation in the eu
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increment that the Austrian, Danish, and Greek capital tax systems have become more
idiosyncratic. In short, the second stylised fact from the international comparison is divergence
of capital income tax systems.
2.2.3 Have systems become more neutral?
If tax rates on interest, dividend, and retained profit, differ, they alter the way in which
investment is financed or the way in which savings are held. For example, the relative
undertaxation of interest induces thin capitalisation -financing by debt rather than equity-
which may be costly if small yet efficient corporations have difficulties in issuing bonds in an
imperfect capital market. We ask whether the relative tax rates on dividend, retained profit, and
interest have converged, in other words, weather capital tax systems have become more neutral.
Figure 2.1   Tax triangle, 1990
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the tax neutrality triangles for 1990 and 2000.
3 A point in a triangle
represents a capital income tax system. Its proportion of tax rates on interest and dividend can
be read off the horizontal side by drawing a line emanating from the retained profit corner
through that point. Similarly, its proportion of tax rates on dividend and retained profit can be
read off the right hand side by drawing a line emanating from the interest corner through that
point. Finally, its proportion of tax rates on retained profit and interest can be read off the left
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middle, labelled N, represent a perfectly neutral tax system. The actual tax system are bunched
around it. Of course, the closer an actual tax system is to N, the more neutral it is; the closer it is
to a corner, the more it discriminates against the respective kind of capital income.
Figure 2.2   Tax triangle, 2000
Most countries lie north of N, which implies that most countries overtax retained profit, both
relative to interest and dividend. No country lies southwest of N, which implies that no country
overtaxes interest. In general, the closer a country is to N, the more neutral is its tax system.
Thus, the distance from N is an indicator of the non-neutrality of a capital tax system. Similarly,
the mean distance from N is an indicator of the neutrality of the set of capital tax systems. Its
1990 value is 0.12 and its 2000 value is 0.15. The main reason for the increase is that Austria,
Denmark, and Ireland, have joined Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal southeast of N. In
other words, the incidence of overtaxation of dividend has increased. The third stylised fact
from the international comparison is a trend away from neutrality.Capital income taxation in the eu
13
Merits and demerits of different effective tax rates
Effective tax rates (etrs) are rough proxy variables that summerize the interaction of various tax rules on an
investment. They can be computed in several ways. Each methods has its own merits and demerits; there is not a
single preferred methodology (OECD, 2000c). The various methods differ in three important ways.
 Forward looking versus backward looking methods
Forward looking etrs are usually based on tax codes. Their advantage is that they measure the impact of taxes
on new investment projects. Instead, backward looking methods refer to existing capital. The etrs on existing
and new capital differ because the mix of new investment can differ from that of existing assets. Moreover, the
tax burden on existing capital can be distorted by the carryforward of losses or tax credits. Compared to the
forward looking methods, the backward looking methods have the advantage that they take account of tax
planning activities, complex tax provisions and discretionary administrative practices of tax authorities.
 Average versus marginal tax rates
Marginal etrs measure the wedge between the pre- and post tax return on a marginal investment project that
does not yield an economic rent. Hence, it measures the incentive effects of taxes on marginal investment
and/or savings decisions. Average etrs measure the overall tax burden on a typical investment. This can be
important for decisions regarding lumpy investment, investment in the presence of imperfect competition, or
for locational decisions of firms. Further, the average etrs give an indication of the tax that bears on companies
which may be important for distributional reasons.
 Corporate versus capital income tax
Etrs can either refer to the tax burden on corporations or on the overall tax burden on capital income that is
levied on the corporate and the personal level.
In this chapter, we distinguish four methods to compute etrs with the following properties and problems:
Macro data: Ratio of capital income tax and operating surplus based on macro data.
Properties: backward looking method; average etr; tax burden on capital income
Problem: consolidation of non-incorporated enterprises
Micro data: Ratio of corporate tax liabilities and pre-tax corporate income.
Properties: backward looking method; average etr; tax burden on corporation
Problem: consolidation of foreign subsidiaries; sensitive to differences in accounting principles
King-Fullerton: Wedge between the pre and post tax rate of return on a marginal investment.
Properties: forward looking method; marginal etr; tax burden on capital income
Problem: sensitive for assumptions regarding inflation, interest rate and investment behaviour
Project-based: Present value of corporate income tax liabilities on profits of a hypothetical investment divided by
the present value amount of net profits.
Properties: forward looking method; average etr; tax burden on corporations
Problem: sensitive for assumptions regarding inflation, interest rate, company typeCapital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
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2.3 Effective tax rates
So far, we have concentrated on capital income tax rates that can directly be constructed from
the tax codes. However, differences between capital income tax bases also impact upon the
behaviour of capital owners. In particular, international differences between depreciation
allowances for machinery and buildings, valuation of inventories, general investment reliefs, the
treatment of reserves and provisions, and the tax treatment of capital gains at the company level
cause differences between the taxable corporate income of two otherwise equivalent
corporations (see OECD, 1991 for a review). Similarly, international differences between the
treatment of health insurance premiums, social security contributions, pension savings, and
education expenses cause differences between the taxable personal income of two otherwise
equivalent persons. Therefore, tax payments differ, even if tax rates would be the same. This
calls for information about tax codes that supplements statutory tax rates. It is provided by so-
called effective tax rates, which usually -but not always- refer to tax payment divided by a measure
of taxable income. They capture the entire capital or corporate income tax system in one single
number. Although in many instances this figure provides a highly desirable summary of the
capital income tax system, it may not do justice to underlying aspects that are important
economically.
Effective tax rates can be computed in alternative ways. Each method of computation has its
merits and demerits and different effective tax rates measure different things. Hence, there is no
such thing as the effective tax rate. The box reviews a number of methodologies to calculate the
effective tax rates. 
2.3.1 Effective tax rates on the basis of macro data
We first calculate time series of effective capital income tax rates according to the method of
Mendoza et al. (1994). That is, we divide the sum of the corporate income tax and personal
capital income tax by the total operating surplus of the economy. Thus, these effective capital
income tax rates correspond to the total tax rates listed in table 2.1. To be precise, they
correspond to the weighted mean of the total capital income tax rate that actually applies, where
the weights are the proportions of dividend, retained profit, and interest in capital income. Table
2.2 lists the effective capital income tax rates. The OECD tax revenue statistics and national
accounts allow calculation of these rates for only a subset of the EU countries up to 1997 .
Table 2.2 reveals relatively high effective tax rates for the UK and Sweden and relatively low
rates for Germany and France. Across time, the effective tax rates are fairly constant, although
we observe a gradual decline for Sweden and Finland.Capital income taxation in the eu
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Mendozas method of calculating effective capital income tax rates is, although widely used, not
undisputed. A fundamental problem is that tax revenue statistics do not attribute tax revenue to
capital income per se, but to corporate and personal income. Similarly, national accounts do not
list capital income per se, but operating surplus of corporate and unincorporated enterprises and
property and entrepreneurial income of households. Therefore, the effective capital income tax
rate -capital income tax divided by capital income- can only be calculated with some ingenuity in
extracting the required information from the available data. For this reason, a number of
authors have sought to refine Mendozas method. For example, Volkerink and De Haan (1999)
exploit additional data sources in calculating their effective capital income tax rates. Table 2.3
lists these rates.
Does it matter whether one uses Mendoza or Volkerink rates? The Mendoza rates tend to
be higher. What is important, however, is that the differences between the rates vary across
countries, but are virtually constant over time. To illustrate, the effective tax rates for Italy and
the UK decline substantially more due to the Volkerink adjustment than the rate for the
Netherlands. This implies that international comparisons at a particular point in time should be
made with caution, but that trends can be inferred with confidence.
Table 2.2 Mendoza effective tax rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria . . . . . . . .
Belgium 33 33 33 35 37 37 36 38
Denmark . . . . . . . .
Finland 45 58 53 34 32 32 37 .
France 26 26 25 26 25 26 28 30
Germany . 27 28 28 25 25 24 23
Great Britain 55 54 45 43 42 47 47 .
Greece . . . . . . . .
Ireland . . . . . . . .
Italy 30 32 35 38 33 33 34 .
Luxemburg . . . . . . . .
Netherlands 31 33 32 35 29 28 31 .
Portugal 13 16 18 16 15 16 . .
Spain . . . . . . . .
Sweden 73 68 54 53 50 41 53 .
Source: own calculations on the basis of OECD tax revenue statistics and national accounts.Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
4 See for example recent studies by the EC (2000) and the OECD (2000a).
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A salient feature of either the Mendoza or Volkerink rate is that they show no discernable
decreasing trend. This appears to be at odds with the clear decreasing trend that we derived
above. Both phenomena can, however, be reconciled by a broadening of the capital income tax
base. The simultaneous reduction in rates and broadening of bases appears to be the
quintessential 'stylised fact' of the recent developments in capital income taxation, and indeed of
income taxation in general
4.
2.3.2 Effective tax rates on the basis of micro data
An alternative method of calculating effective tax rates is based upon micro data from the
financial accounts of individual firms (MARC, 1999). The corporate income tax paid by the firm
is divided by its pre tax corporate income. The median ratio in a country is then the effective tax
rate (the mean is too sensitive for outliers if there is a limited number of firms). Table 2.4 lists
the median effective corporate income tax rates for all EU countries from 1990 to 1999. For
Luxembourg, the small number of observations causes a rather  large volatility in effective tax
rates. We therefore do not report these figures.
Table 2.3 Volkerink effective tax rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Austria 19 20 22 . . . .
Belgium . . . . . . .
Denmark . . . . . . .
Finland 24 27 23 . . . .
France 24 26 25 . . . .
Germany . . . . . . .
Great Britain 41 38 31 31 31 34 36
Greece . . . . . . .
Ireland . . . . . . .
Italy 20 21 25 27 23 23 24
Luxemburg . . . . . . .
Netherlands 26 27 26 30 27 26 30
Portugal . . . . . . .
Spain . . . . . . .
Sweden . . . . . . .
Source: Volkerink and De Haan (1999)Capital income taxation in the eu
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The effective tax rates in table 2.4 are not directly comparable to those of tables 2.2 and 2.3. The
reason is that they are corporate income tax rates, not capital income tax rates. Nevertheless, their
trends sketch the same picture: they do not change much, and therefore confirm the stylised fact
of a simultaneous reduction in rates and broadening of bases. 
Table 2.4 paints a picture that small countries set relatively low effective tax rates, compared
to large countries. More specifically, the five largest EU members, Germany, France, Italy, UK
and Spain, have an effective tax rate that is, on average over the sample period, 11.2% higher
than in the smaller member states (see chapter 4 for a further elaboration on this observation).
This is also illustrated by the weighted mean of the effective tax rates in table 2.4 (where we use
GDP as weights). Indeed, the weighted mean is, on average over the sample period, 6.1%-points 
higher than the unweighted mean. 
Table 2.4. reveals also that the effective tax rates have converged across countries over the
past decade. This is reflected in a gradually declining standard deviation from 10.6 in 1990 to
6.5 in 1999. This may seem at odds with the conclusion from the previous section that capital
tax systems have diverged. There are two fundamental differences, however, between the
approach of the previous section and the effective tax rates in this section. First, the effective tax
rates refer to corporate taxes while the previous section deals with the entire system of capital
Table 2.4 Worldscope effective tax rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Austria 18 22 14 16 20 17 24 25 21 24
Belgium 17 16 22 23 23 24 23 22 21 17
Denmark 33 32 30 30 32 32 31 31 32 31
Finland 45 37 34 24 26 27 28 28 28 28
France 33 33 33 33 33 36 35 38 38 38
Germany 48 49 49 44 41 41 41 40 40 41
Great Britain 33 31 31 30 30 30 30 29 29 29
Greece 11 11 24 29 29 31 33 35 35 35
Ireland 20 22 19 20 17 22 21 21 24 22
Italy 38 41 47 50 44 46 45 43 44 40
Luxembourg
a
. . . . . . . . . .
Netherlands 31 32 32 31 31 31 32 31 31 30
Portugal 17 20 27 25 20 23 22 21 24 25
Spain 27 28 29 27 25 24 26 26 26 29
Sweden 31 32 30 19 28 27 28 28 28 28
Mean 28.7 29 30.2 27.7 28.4 29.3 30 29.8 30 29.8
Weighted mean
b
35.5 36.1 37.3 35.7 34.1 35 35.1 34.8 34.9 34.6
Standard deviation 10.6 9.8 9.1 9 7.4 7.5 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.5
a
 We do not present figures for Luxemburg because of too few data.
b
 Country medians weighted by GDP.





income taxation. Secondly, in contrast to table 2.1, the effective tax rates take account of
differences in the tax base.
The effective tax rates on the basis of micro data suffer from the practice of consolidating the
financial accounts of parents and their foreign controlled corporations. In particular, the Dutch
effective tax rate is contaminated by German taxes because Philips consolidates the accounts of
the Dutch parent with its German affiliates, subsidiaries, and branches, while the German
effective tax rate is contaminated by Dutch taxes because Siemens consolidates the accounts of
the German parent with its Dutch affiliates, subsidiaries, and branches. However, one can
eliminate this contamination in several ways. Collins and Shackleford (1995) show that these
adjustments hardly change the results. This is consistent with MARC (1999) who show that
firm characteristics do not have a significant impact on the average tax rate of firms.
2.3.3 Marginal effective tax rates on the basis of tax codes
A third class of effective tax rates is calculated on the basis the tax code, not on the basis of tax
data. King and Fullerton (1984) derive the 'marginal effective tax rate', the percentage wedge
that a tax code drives between the pre and post tax required rates of return on marginal
investment projects. In formula form, this is
where - stands for the marginal effective tax rate and p denotes the required pre-tax rate of
return on a marginal investment (the user cost of capital) which is necessary to offer a post tax
rate of return on capital of r. The term pr is the marginal tax wedge that measures the
difference between the pre-tax and post-tax returns on capital.
The King-Fullerton effective tax rate in (2.7) can explicitly take into account the fiscal details
such as depreciation allowance, inventory valuation, investment incentives, and preferential
savings provisions. Hence, the King-Fullerton tax rate intends to capture the main tenets of the
tax code that impact upon investment decisions in a single number. In econometric analysis this
ex-ante tax rate is to be preferred over the ex-post effective tax rate. This is because of possible
simultaneity biases caused by two way causality between investment behaviour and tax revenue.
However, one disadvantage of the King-Fullerton rate is that it is difficult to calculate and
interpret, another that they are sensitive to minor changes in the assumptions underlying their
calculation. For instance, the marginal effective tax rate is sensitive to the assumed interest rate
or the inflation rate. Furthermore, it is derived under strong assumptions regarding optimal
investment behaviour, perfect competition, a small open economy that cannot exert market
power, infinitely divisible investment and decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital in
production (OECD, 2000c). For these reasons, the absolute figures of the King-Fullerton ratesCapital income taxation in the eu
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are not so informative. However, they can be informative to compare the tax burdens across
countries and over time.
Table 2.5 lists the King-Fullerton marginal effective tax rates as given by Chennells and
Griffith (1997). Being the percentage wedge between the pre and post tax rates of return that are
required by individual shareholders (rather than the corporate management), they comprise
both corporate and the personal income taxation. From this perspective, they are more closely
related to Mendoza and Volkerink effective tax rates than to the Worldscope effective tax rates.
Their method of calculation is, however, fundamentally different.
The marginal effective tax rates suggest that France and Ireland have relatively low rates, as
compared to the other reported countries. Compared to the effective tax rates based macro and
micro data, the King-Fullerton marginal effective tax rates appear to be rather low. However,
their development over time paint a similar picture: their mean value remains constant. Thus,
the rate reducing - base broadening trend is again supported.
2.3.4 Average effective tax rates from tax codes
Devereux and Griffith (1998a) adjust the King-Fullerton approach in order to calculate the
average effective tax rate, i.e. the average percentage wedge on a range of inframarginal
investment projects on which firms earn an economic rent. In the same tradition, Jacobs and
Spengel (1999) use the 'European Tax Analyzer', a computer simulation program containing a
lot of institutional detail, to calculate the wedge between the pre and post tax wealth of
hypothetical firms. The latter methodology is usually referred to as project-based analysis of
Table 2.5 King-Fullerton marginal effective tax rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria . . . . . . . .
Belgium . . . . . . . 24
Denmark . . . . . . . .
Finland . . . . . . . .
France 12 11 9 9 9 . . .
Germany 24 27 27 24 19 . . 25
UK 17 16 16 12 17 . . 21
Greece . . . . . . . .
Ireland 2 5 4 4 4 . . .
Italy 18 19 19 24 25 . . .
Luxemburg . . . . . . . .
Netherlands . . . . . . . 20
Portugal . . . . . . . .
Spain 21 23 21 20 20 . . .
Sweden . . . . . . . .
Sources: Chennells and Griffith(1997); CPB (1997)Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
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effective tax rates. Table 2.6 presents calculations for the average effective tax rate, as derived by
Chennells and Griffith.
Table 2.6 reveals that the average effective tax rate based on tax codes is higher than the
marginal effective tax rates from table 2.5. The reason is that many tax deductions apply to the
cost of investment projects (which, for the marginal investment project, are equal to the rate of
return) but are irrelevant for economic rent.
Again, Ireland appears to be a low-tax country as compared to the other countries analysed.
France is more in line with the other countries than with the marginal effective tax rate. The
pattern over time suggests a stationary effective tax burden.
2.3.5 The interpretation of effective tax rates
In arguments about tax competition one often refers to the effective tax rate. However, there are
many different variants. Which one does one mean? The substantial differences between the
values of the effective tax rates according to Mendoza et al., and Volkerink  and De Haan
exemplifies that being vague is not innocuous, not in the least because these differences differ
across countries. To bring this point home, consider table 2.7, which lists different effective tax
rates of the three largest EU countries for 1994.
Table 2.6 Devereux-Griffith average effective tax rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Austria . . . . .
Belgium . . . . .
Denmark . . . . .
Finland . . . . .
France 17 16 15 14 14
Germany
Great Britain 18 17 17 17 18
Greece . . . . .
Ireland 5 6 5 5 5
Italy 18 18 18 19 19
Luxemburg . . . . .
Netherlands . . . . .
Portugal . . . . .
Spain 20 21 20 20 20
Sweden . . . . .
Source: Chennells and Griffith(1997)Capital income taxation in the eu
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It may be noted that the ranking of the countries changes radically. Germany tops the list
according to the King-Fullerton effective tax rate, France according to the Jacobs-Spengel
effective tax rates, and Great Britain according to the Mendoza effective tax rate. This does not
necessarily mean that one effective tax rate is false and another true. They simply measure
different things. It does mean, however, that each rate on its own does not merit sweeping
conclusions about tax systems.
Although differences between effective tax rates vary across countries, they appear to be
fairly constant over time. This merits another important conclusion: international comparisons
are precarious - we have said it before - whereas trends can be inferred with confidence.
2.4 The impact of capital income taxes on saving and investment
Governments motivate the use of capital income taxes on several grounds. Among them,
horizontal and vertical equity play an important role. Moreover, governments may find it
difficult to distinguish between labour and capital income, e.g. in case of self-employed and
small corporate businesses. To avoid tax arbitrage, both incomes are usually taxed at more or
less equivalent rates. However, the capital income tax system can have important implications
for the capital market. This holds for both the statutory tax rates in  , and the - -
 -

determinants of the tax base, captured by the effective tax rates. In particular, capital income
taxes change relative prices on capital markets, thereby affecting the size and composition of
savings and investments.
2.4.1 Effect on savings
Let us start with the impact of capital income taxes on savings. Capital income taxes reduce the
net rate of return on savings and thus tend to distort intertemporal decision making by private
households. In particular, a lower net rate of return has a substitution and an income effect
that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, a lower net rate of return increases the price
of future relative to present consumption and induces substitution of the first by the latter. This
adverse effect ons savings is caused by the marginal (effective) tax rate on capital income. On the
other hand, a lower net rate of return decreases life-time wealth by reducing the present value of
future earnings and induces efforts towards smoothing of present and future consumption. This
Table 2.7 Effective tax rates, 1994 (rankings in parentheses)
King-Fullerton Jacobs-Spengel Mendoza Worldscope
France (3) 9 (1) 41 (2) 25 (2) 33
Germany (1) 19 (2) 37 (2) 25 (1) 41
Great Britain (2) 17 (3) 20 (1) 42 (3) 30
Sources: Tables 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5 and Jacobs and Spengel (1999).Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
5 The literature distinguishes a number of more subtle effects of these taxes on saving behaviour. See Boadway and
Wildasin (1994) for a survey.
6 The traditional view assumes that payment of dividend serves as a signal to shareholders that the firm is doing
well. Hence, dividend payout has some intrinsic value that compensates for the unfavourable tax treatment of
dividend. Dividend taxes therefore increase the cost of equity finance and reduce investment. The new view
assumes that mature firms finance marginal investments by retained earnings. Shareholders can thus not escape
dividend taxes since these will be distributed either now or later if they are retained in the firm. Dividend taxes
therefore get capitalized in share prices, but have no impact on investment. 
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effect, induced by the average (effective) tax burden on capital income, implies an increase of
savings. Which effect dominates is an empirical issue. The evidence on the compensated
elasticity of aggregate savings is inconclusive: some studies suggest that a higher net rate of
return has no impact, while others find a mild positive impact, with elasticities ranging from 0.2
to 0.4.
5 The uncompensated elasticity of savings, however, is always negative. Hence, a lower
marginal tax rate on savings at a given average tax will unambiguously increase savings.
Capital income tax rates also affect the composition of households savings portfolios. The
relative taxation of different types of capital income, rather than the absolute level of taxation, is
of particular importance here. For instance, the preferential tax treatment for retirement savings
and owner-occupied housing induces households to engage primarily in these types of saving.
Also the non-neutral tax treatment of debt and equity and that of dividend and retained earnings
tends to distort household investment portfolios.
2.4.2 Effect on investments
Corporate income taxes are generally thought to distort investment behaviour by firms through
several channels. First of all, a corporate income tax reduces the net rate of return on the
marginal investment project, inducing firms to invest less than they would otherwise have done.
However, interest is deductible from the corporate income tax base. Thus, corporate income
taxes should leave the net rate of return on the marginal investment project untouched, provided
that it is financed by debt. This leads proponents of the so-called optimistic view to argue that
corporate income taxes are immaterial for investment decisions. However, proponents of the
traditional and the new view point out that, although debt financing appears most attractive,
firms do in fact finance investment with equity.
6 Accordingly, they argue that corporate income
taxes are not immaterial. Recent empirical literature supports these latter views. For instance,
Hassett and Hubbard (1997) conclude on the basis of a review of empirical studies that there
appears to be consensus that the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital is
somewhere in the range between 0.5 and 1.
Not only the marginal tax but also the average tax burden on corporations may reduce the
incentives to invest. In particular, a substantial number of firms is liquidity constrained due to
capital market imperfections. This may be due to asymmetric information between creditors and
firms regarding risky investment projects. A lower corporate income tax will relax liquidityCapital income taxation in the eu
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constraints so that firms will find it easier to finance new investments. Empirical studies indeed
provide evidence for the impact of net internal funds on investment (see e.g. Hubbard, 1997).
A third effect of corporate income taxes on investment is due to uncertainty. By taxing
profits and allowing a deduction against other income for losses, the government shares in the
risk of uncertain investments. Accordingly,  corporate taxes may encourage investors to put
more funds in risky businesses (Arrow and Lind, 1970). Note, however, that there are usually
limitations on the magnitudes of the losses that can be offset. Moreover, to the extent that
corporate taxes reduce wealth of the investor, they may also reduce the willingness to take risk.
The overall effect thus remains ambiguous.
Capital income tax systems can also have effects on the source of finance of investments.
Indeed, non-neutrality induces substitution towards the relatively tax-favoured way of finance.
For instance, the preferential tax treatment of debt versus equity encourages firms to finance
investments primarily by debt, a phenomenon that is referred to as thin capitalization. This
erodes capital tax revenue, leads to less solvent, undercapitalized firms and discriminates against
new firms that have more difficulty to obtain debt finance. In particular if small, innovative
entrant firms find it relatively difficult to issue bonds, then these distortions aggravate their
difficulty in financing their investments. This could be detrimental to economic growth. 
Furthermore, tax systems generally favour the financing of investments through retained
earnings as compared to new equity. This may cause lock-in effects, with adverse implications
for the flexibility of capital markets.
Finally, corporate taxes can affect the international allocation of savings and investments. We
will discuss this extensively in chapter 3.
2.5 Conclusions
To recapitulate, we have examined the development of capital income taxation in the EU over
the last ten years. On the basis of a simple model of capital income taxation we can draw three
conclusions. First, capital taxes have decreased. There is an unambiguous downward trend in
economy wide tax rates on interest, dividend, and retained profit. Secondly, capital income tax
systems have not converged. On the contrary: capital tax systems have become more dissimilar
in their mix of taxation of interest, dividend, and retained profit. Thirdly, capital income taxation
has become less neutral. The undertaxation of interest relative to the taxation of both dividend
and retained profit has not been resolved. The reason is that interest remains deductible from
the corporate income tax base. In addition, some countries have scrapped capital gains taxes,
leading to undertaxation of retained profit relative to dividend.
Unlike the statutory capital income tax rates, effective capital income tax rates, however
measured, do not show a clear downward trend. The downward trend of statutory rates and the
constancy of effective rates can, however, be reconciled by a broadening of the tax base. ThisCapital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
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throws up the quintessential 'stylised fact' of the development of capital income taxation: there
has been a simultaneous decrease of tax rates and broadening of the tax base. In passing, we
have pointed out that effective tax rates should be interpreted with care. A large variety of
calculation methods exist, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Their power lies not
in cross country comparison but in inferring trends.
According to economic theory, capital income taxes tend to reduce the level of savings and
investments. Furthermore, they have a significant impact upon the composition of savings and
investments. In the next chapter we address a third distortion associated with capital income
taxes, namely how they impact upon the international allocation of savings and investment.
Appendix
Table 2.8 lists the five basic capital income tax rates for each EU country in 1990. The first
column lists the personal income tax rate on interest  . Most countries tax include dividend in -
personal income, implying that the personal income tax rate on interest is the personal income
tax rate (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). It differs between individuals because of the
progressivity of personal income taxation. We abstract from this complication by choosing the
top personal income rate for each of these countries. The tax rates in the first column should
therefore be interpreted as upper bounds. Some countries tax interest through a final
withholding tax (Belgium and Finland). Since the final withholding tax rate is flat there exists no
complication with respect to progressivity.
The second and third columns respectively list the corporate tax rate on dividend   and the -
personal income tax rates on dividend  . The corporate income tax rate on dividend is simply -

the headline corporate income tax rate, except under Germany's split rate tax system. The
personal income tax rate on dividend incorporates double taxation relief. Some countries operate
a dual tax system in which dividend is taxed at a zero or reduced personal income tax rate
(Austria, Belgium, and Greece). Other countries impute part of net dividend to individual
shareholders (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom).
The fourth and fifth column respectively list the corporate income tax rate on retained profit
 and personal capital gains tax rate  . The corporate income tax rate on retained profit is - -
simply the headline corporate income tax rate. Most countries include capital gains in personal
income, implying that the capital gains tax rate is the personal income tax rate (Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and
Sweden). Other countries tax capital gains at a special or zero rate (Belgium, Ireland, The
Netherlands, and Portugal).Wherever these rates depends on whether capital gains are
speculative or not, we choose the rates that apply to speculative capital gains.Capital income taxation in the eu
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In the decade between 1990 and 2000 numerous capital income tax reforms have been
implemented: countries have introduced and scrapped final withholding taxes on interest and
dividend, have moved towards a classical system,  a dual system, or an imputation system.
Moreover, countries have excluded capital gains from personal income. How these reforms have
materialised in the five basic capital income tax rates is apparent from table 2.9, which lists
these rates for each EU country in 2000.
We put in a caveat: we abstract from surcharges and local taxes, and from differences
between residents and non residents. Thus, the information in tables 2.8 and 2.9 is thus
insufficient to capture the legal intricacies that lie at the heart of, for example, the Primarolo
report (Council, 1999). It does, however, constitute a rough and ready summary of the most
salient aspects of EU capital taxation.Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
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Table 2.8 Capital income tax rates, EU 1990
           interest           dividend            retained profit
personal (-p) corporate (-d) personal (-pd') corporate (-r) personal (-c)
Austria 50    30     25
a
    30    50    
Belgium 25
b 
41     25
b  
  41    0    
Denmark 40    40     25
c  
  40    40    
Finland 30
b
  25     5
d  
   25    43    
France 56.8 37     35,2
e
37    56.8 
Germany 53    36
f
   26,6
g
50    53    
Great Britain 40    35     20
h
    35    40    
Greece 50
i     46     0
j
     46
k
  50    
Ireland 56    43
l
    5
m
   43    60    
Italy 50    36     34,4
n
36    50    
Luxemburg 56    34     56     34    56    
The Netherlands 60    35     60     35    0
0 
 




36.5 10    
Spain 56    40     56,1
r
40    56    
Sweden 25    40     25
s   
40    25    
Mean 45.85 36.97 28.76 37.9 39.32
Standard deviation 11.42 4.98 17.61 5.93 19.8
Source: IBFD (1990)
a
 Austria taxes dividend at a rate equal to 50% of the effective personal income tax rate.
b
 Final withholding tax.
c
 Denmark imputes ¼ of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders. This tax credit constitutes taxable personal income. Thus, given a
statutory personal income tax rate (on dividends) of 40%, a personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.4(1+1/4)-1/4)#100=25%.
d
 Finland imputes 2/3 of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income rate (on capital income) of
43%, a personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.43(1+2/3)-2/3)#100=5%.
e
 France imputes ½ of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 56.8%, a personal
income tax rate on dividends of (0.568(1+1/2)-½)#100=35.2%.
f
 Refunds of corporate income taxes are such that the corporate income tax rate on dividend equals 36%.
g
 Germany imputes 9/16 of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 53%, a
personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.53(1+9/16)-9/16)#100=26.6%.
h
 The United Kingdom imputes 25/75 of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of
40%, a personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.40(1+25/75)-25/75)#100=20%.
i
 Greece exempts interest on government bonds from personal income taxation.
j
 Greece exempts dividend from personal income taxation.
k
 Greece taxes income of mining and manufacturing corporations at a reduced rate.
l
 Ireland taxes income of manufacturing corporations at a reduced rate.
m
 Ireland imputes 28/72 of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 56%, a
personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.56(1+28/72)-28/72)#100=5%
n
 Italy imputes 9/16 of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income top rate of 50%, a personal
income tax rate on dividends of (0.50(1+9/16)-9/16)#100=34.4%.
o
 The Netherlands tax capital gains at a flat rate of 25% in case the underlying capital pertains to a substantial interest of at least 5% of a
corporation.
p
Portugal taxes income of agricultural corporations at a reduced rate.
q
 Portugal imputes 20% of the corporate tax paid on gross dividends to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory corporate income tax rate
of 36.5% and a personal income tax rate of 40% a personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.40(1+0.20#(0.365/0.635))-
.20#(0.365/0.635))#100=33.1%.
r
 Spain imputes 10% of net dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 56%, a personal
income tax rate on dividends of (0.56(1+0.10)-0.10)#100=51.6%.
s
 The Swedish local personal income tax rate is 30%.Capital income taxation in the eu
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Table 2.9 Capital income tax rates, EU 2000
           interest           dividend           retained profit
personal (-p) corporate (-d) personal (-pd') corporate (-r) personal (-c)
Austria 25
a
  34        25
a 
   34    0
b  
 
Belgium 55    39        55      39    0    
Denmark 15
c 
32        40      32    0    
Finland 29
a 
29        0
d      29    29   




     33    54   
Germany 51    30
g     
30
h 
    40    51   
Great Britain 40    30        25
i 
     30    40   
Greece 15
a
   40
j    
   0.5
k
  40    45   
Ireland 24




l    
   13,5
m
37    45   
Luxemburg 46    30        23
n    
30    46   
Netherlands 60    35        60       35    0
o 
 
Portugal 40    32
p    
  23,1
q   32    10   
Spain 39.6 35
r    
  15,4
s  
35    39.6 
Sweden 30    28        30       28    30   
Mean 36.7 32.6    27.8    33.2 27.3
Standard deviation 14    4.1    16.8    4.5 19.8
Source: IBFD (2000)
a
 Final withholding tax.
b
 Austria taxes capital gains at 50% of the effective personal income tax if the underlying capital pertains to an interest of at least 10% of a
corporation.
c
 The mean Danish local personal income tax rate is 32%.
d
 Finland imputes 29/71 of net dividend as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate (on capital
income) of 29%, a personal income tax rate on dividend of (0.29(1+29/71)-29/71)#100=0%.
e
 The French surtax on the corporate income tax liability is10%.
f
 France imputes ½ of the net dividend as a tax credit to the shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 54%, a
personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.54(1+1/2)-½)#100=31%.
g
 Germany has a split corporate income tax rate: 30% on gross dividends, and 40% on retained profits.
h
 Germany imputes 3/7 of net dividend as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 51%, a personal
income tax rate on dividends of (0.51(1+3/7)-3/7)#100=30%.
i
 The United Kingdom imputes 1/9 of net dividend as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate (on
dividends) of 32.5%, a personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.325(1+1/9)-1/9)#100=25%.
j
 The Greek tax rate for income of corporations listed at the Athens stock exchange is 35%.
k
 Greece exempts dividend from personal income taxation.
l
 Italy has a tax rate of 19% on an imputed return of 7% on the sum of retained profits since 1996. The tax is deductible from the corporate
income tax base. Thus, the corporate income tax liability equals, given a statutory corporate income tax rate of 37%, 0.37#[gross
dividend+retained profits-0,07#retained profits since 1996]-0,19# 0,07#sum of retained profits since 1996.
m
 Italy imputes 37/63 of net dividend as a tax credit to the shareholders, which yields, given a statutory corporate income tax rate of 45.5%, a
personal income tax rate on dividends of(0.455(1+37/63)-37/63)#100=13.5%.
n
 Luxembourg exempts 50% of net dividend from personal income taxation. Thus, given the statutory personal income tax rate of 46%, the
personal income tax rate on dividend is 0.5#46=23%.
o
 The Netherlands tax capital gains at a flat rate of 25% if the underlying capital pertains to an interest of at least 5% of a corporation.
p
 The Portugese local income tax rate is 10%.
q
 Portugal imputes 60% of the corporate income tax paid on gross dividends as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields given a statutory
corporate income tax rate of 32% and personal income rate of 40%, a personal income tax rate on dividends of (0.40(1+0.60#32/68)-
0.60#32/68)#100=23.1%.
r
 The Bask corporate income tax rate is 32%.
s
 Spain imputes 40% of the net dividend as a tax credit to shareholders, which yields, given a statutory personal income tax rate of 39.6%, a
personal income tax rate on dividend of (0.396(1+0.40)-0.40)#100=15,4%. The local personal income tax rate is, in addition, 8,4%.Capital income taxation in the eu Capital income taxation in Europe
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3 Internationalization and capital income taxation
Chapter 2 elaborates on the national tax treatment of corporations and the capital income they
generate; this chapter draws attention to the tax treatment of international capital flows. Due to
internationalization, taxes on capital not only distort the decision to save or invest, but also the
international allocation of investment and profits.
3.1 International capital flows
Households can invest their savings in several manners: they can choose between debt and
equity, and between domestic and foreign assets. Households investment in foreign assets is
usually called foreign portfolio investment (FPI). This FPI is often channelled through financial
intermediaries such as mutual funds or pension funds. In statistical information on foreign
capital flows, FPI is defined as foreign investments in cases where the investor controls less than
some fixed proportion of the capital stock that is invested in. The IMF guidelines propose a
proportion of 10%. Hence, FPI in statistics not only refers to private households investing in
foreign equity, but also to multinational firms that hold small foreign stakes. In practice,
statistical information on FPI largely coincides with individual investors undertaking foreign
investment.
Households may also invest in multinational firms of which the parent company resides in
the home country. These multinationals may use these funds to invest in foreign controlled
corporations such as affiliates or subsidiaries. This is referred to as foreign direct investment
(FDI). In statistics following the IMF guidelines, FDI is defined as foreign investments in which
the firm that invests owns more than 10% of the stock that is invested in. FDI flows consist of
two broad categories: (i) direct net transfers from the parent company to a foreign affiliate,
either through equity or debt, and (ii) reinvested earnings by a foreign affiliate.
Foreign investment has expanded rapidly during the last decade. This is illustrated in figure
3.1 which plots the growth of FPI, FDI, and GDP between 1989-1997. It shows that FDI and FPI
in EU-countries grew considerably faster than GDP. Especially the growth in FPI has been high
during the last decades: whereas the share of FPI in total international capital flows was about
one quarter during the 1970s, it raised to three-quarter of total foreign investments in the
1990's (Slemrod et al., 1996). These trends illustrate the increasing internationalization of
capital flows. For the coming decade, this expansion is likely to continue. Lower information
costs due to information- and communication technology, the completion of EMU, and the
alleviation of technical barriers on the internal EU-market for financial services will all
contribute to further internationalization and, especially, Europeanization of capital markets.Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
7  US data report investments in property, plant and equipment, which constitutes a better proxy for real
investment than FDI. In Europe, such data are generally not available.
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Figure 3.1   Growth in international capital flows in the EU compared to GDP growth (1989 = 100)
Source: IMF Financial Statistics.
Statistical information on FDI and FPI involves financial flows that do not necessarily
correspond to the allocation of real investment. For instance, a firm that receives funds from a
foreign household (i.e. FPI) may use it to finance a subsidiary in a third country. The link
between FPI and real investment is thus broken. Also FDI flows do not necessarily involve real
investment in property, plant and equipment (PPE). For instance, the change in ownership in
case of foreign acquisitions is registered as FDI, while there is no real investment taking place.
Indeed, the capital stock in the receiving country is not affected by this type of FDI. Estimates
suggest that mergers and acquisitions account for more than 60% of all FDI in advanced
countries (OECD, 2000b). The distinction between the observed financial capital flows and the
underlying real investment is, however, important for economic analyses. Indeed, it is the
allocation of real capital that determines economic growth, productivity and the global efficiency
of capital allocation. But the financial flows are also relevant, e.g. for tax purposes, the income
distribution and the amount of financial intermediation in a country. Unfortunately, the data
generally do not allow for a distinction between financial and real investments.
7Internationalization and capital income taxation
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3.2 Taxation of international capital
Foreign capital income is taxed either on the basis of the source principle or on the residence
principle. Under the source principle, capital income is taxed in the country where the capital is
invested in, i.e. where the income is generated, irrespective of where the owner of that capital
resides. Under the residence principle, capital income is taxed in the country where the owner
resides, irrespective of the country that is invested in. In practice, governments use both source-
based taxes, such as corporate income taxes, and residence-based taxes on capital income, such
as personal income taxes. This may give rise to international double taxation, which is discussed
below.
3.2.1 Foreign portfolio investment
If households invest in foreign debt, the rate of return on this investment is generally not taxed
in the source country as interest payments are typically exempt from corporate income taxes.
Only if countries levy a withholding tax on interest paid to non-residents (such as Portugal and
Greece) is interest taxed in the source country. Under the OECD Model Tax Convention,
withholding taxes on foreign interest are capped at 10%. Most countries that levy withholding
taxes on interest, however, exempt non-residents (such as Belgium and Austria). In the absence
of withholding taxes, interest is only taxed on the basis of the residence principle. In that case,
the tax system does not affect household decisions regarding the choice between domestic or
foreign deposits. 
Households investing in foreign equity are usually taxed twice. First, the return on equity is
taxed by the corporate income tax in the host country. Second, dividend payments (or capital
gains) are taxed again under the income tax in the domestic country on the basis of the
residence principle. This international double taxation is similar to the economic double taxation
of investment in domestic equity under the classical tax system. As imputation credits often do
not apply to foreign investors, imputation systems typically discriminate between domestic and
foreign investors. 
3.2.2 Foreign direct investment
Also FDI by multinational firms runs the risk of international double taxation. In particular, a
foreign subsidiary is subject to corporate income tax in the host country. But these profits of the
subsidiary can be taxed again under the corporate income tax in the home country of the parent.
As this international double taxation would strongly discourage international business activity,
most countries avoid it by means of bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD Model tax
convention. In the EU, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive ensures that countries either adopt a
credit system or an exemption system to avoid international double taxation within the Union.Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
32
In the EU, Italy, Greece and the UK adopt tax credit systems. All other countries adopt the tax
exemption system. 
Under the exemption system, foreign income that is taxed in the host country is exempt
from taxation in the home country of the parent. Hence, profits are only taxed in the country
where the subsidiary is located. To illustrate, a Dutch firm that invests in a German subsidiary is
subject to the German corporate income tax alone. Dividend payments to the Dutch parent
company thus remain untaxed in the Netherlands. Countries that adopt the exemption system
differ with respect to their application of these exemptions. In some countries, firms can claim
tax exemptions only if they control a substantial share of a company and when a minimum of
foreign corporate income tax is paid. Other countries impose less tight conditions on the
ownership share or on the foreign tax paid.
Under a credit system, tax liabilities in the host country of the subsidiary are credited against
taxes in the home country of the parent. For instance, the corporate income tax in Greece is
40% while Denmark adopts a rate of 32%. As Greece adopt the credit system, a Greek
corporation that earns 100 euro in Denmark pays 32 euro corporate income tax in Denmark and
an additional 8 euro in Greece. Would Greece have adopted the exemption system, the
corporation would have been subject to the Danish corporate income tax alone. Governments
generally limit the foreign tax credits that firms can claim. Indeed, if foreign tax payments
exceed the tax liability in the home country of the parent company, there exists an excess foreign
tax credit. In that case, firms are usually permitted to claim no more tax credit than the domestic
tax liability, i.e. it is in effect exempt from taxation. If the tax liability in the home country of the
parent exceeds the foreign tax payment, there is deficit tax credit. Tax credit countries differ with
respect to the application of tax credits, e.g. whether excess foreign credits can be compensated
by deficit tax credits elsewhere or whether compensation is allowed by carrying backward or
forward the deficit foreign credit through time.
Countries that adopt foreign tax credits to avoid international double taxation generally also
permit tax deferral. In particular, profits of foreign affiliates that are reinvested in that company
are deferred until they are repatriated to the parent company through dividend payments. Only
upon the date of repatriation, is the parent company subject to corporate income tax in the
home country. This makes the impact of home country taxation less important for investors
from tax credit countries.
3.2.3 Residence versus source taxes
There is an economic rationale for the prevalence of residence-based capital taxes over source-
based capital taxes. The reason is that, in contrast to residence-based taxes, source-based taxes
violate the condition for so-called capital export neutrality, which requires that an investor is
taxed at the same effective rate of capital income taxation if it invests in alternative countries.
Differences in source taxes cause an unlevel international playing field, thereby distorting theInternationalization and capital income taxation
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international allocation of capital with an associated welfare cost. In particular, with different
effective tax rates, people invest too much in low tax countries and too little in high tax
countries. The reason is that arbitrage on the international capital market implies equality of net
marginal returns to capital. Different tax rates thus causes differences in the gross marginal
returns to capital: the gross marginal return to capital in the high tax country must be higher
than in the low tax country. This implies that world production (and therefore world welfare) can
be increased by relocating capital from the low tax to the high tax country.
Although residence-based taxes are compatible with capital export neutrality, they violate
capital import neutrality, a condition for efficient allocation of capital over time. In particular,
investors should face the same tax rate. If they dont, then those facing low rates overinvest,
while those facing high rates underinvest. To see this, one has to think of investment as an
exchange of present for future consumption. From the perspective of an individual investor, it is
optimal to invest until his marginal rate of substitution -the amount of present consumption
that he is, at the margin, willing to give up for future consumption- equals the net marginal
return to capital. If investors from different countries face different tax rates, they also face
different net marginal returns to capital, and their marginal rates of substitution will differ.
Basic microeconomics teaches us that everyone would be better off by mutually exchanging
present and future consumption, i.e. by lending and loaning.
Among economists there is consensus that capital export neutrality is more important than
capital import neutrality (see e.g. Keen, 1993; Sørensen, 1993). We list three reasons. First,
capital export neutrality, guaranteeing production efficiency, is always desirable, even in a
second best world where (intertemporal) consumption patterns are distorted by capital income
taxation. In contrast, it may be wise to sacrifice capital import neutrality. In particular, if savings
where highly elastic in one country and highly inelastic in another, then it would be optimal,
from a world perspective, to apply a low tax rate to investors from the first, and a high tax rate to
investors from the second country. Secondly, capital export neutrality is consistent with
horizontal equity in the sense that two investors from the same country are taxed similarly,
regardless of the division of investment over domestic and foreign projects. This is not
necessarily true under a regime of capital import neutrality. A third reason for favouring capital
export neutrality over capital import neutrality is empirical: the welfare loss associated with a
violation of capital export neutrality is determined by the sensitivity of capital across space; the
welfare loss of violating capital import neutrality depends on the sensitivity of saving across
time, determined by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. As empirical research suggests,
distortions in the allocation of capital across space are large, relative to the intertemporal
distortions. Hence, violating capital export neutrality is more distortive than violating capital
import neutrality.
Although economic theory thus suggests that residence-based taxes are to be preferred, they
are problematic in practice. To quote Slemrod (1995): ... whereas it is not desirable to tax capitalInternationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
8 Tax havens are small jurisdictions with little production, a stable political climate, a low or zero tax on foreign
capital income, lack of transparancy, and lack of effective exchange of information usually due to strict bank
secrecy laws. The OECD has identified 47 of such tax havens. In Europe, well-known examples are Andorra,
Monaco and the Channel Islands.
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on a source basis (because they are highly distortionary), it is not administratively feasible to tax
capital on a residence basis. The underlying reason for this infeasibility of residence taxes is
that fiscal authorities require all the information of their residents about foreign capital income.
This can be problematic because governments generally cannot obtain information from foreign
firms and foreign financial intermediaries on the amounts of capital income they paid to each
domestic resident. Due to these information problems, households can be encouraged to hold
foreign instead of domestic deposits, thereby evading taxes in the country of residence. There is
ample anecdotical evidence suggesting that this tax evasion is important (Dehejia and Genschel,
1998). For instance, the flourishing financial sectors and huge assets held in countries with a
bank secrecy -such as Luxemburg and Switzerland- suggests that households use these countries
to evade residence-based taxes on capital. Also tax havens play an important role for tax evasion.
8
To the extent that the shift of savings abroad involves (learning) costs, not all taxes will be
evaded. But this seems especially relevant for small savers, not for those with substantial assets.
Residence-based taxes would thus be equivalent to a tax on small savers, which seems less
attractive on equity grounds.
A solution to the information problem is to improve international information exchange
among tax administrations. A number of bilateral tax treaties between countries already try to
reduce tax evasion by making agreements on information exchange. Also the EU has recently
agreed upon information exchange regarding interest income paid to foreigners within the EU.
This is an important step forward. But information exchange also faces a number of serious
problems in practice (Tanzi, 1995). First of all, there are legal difficulties regarding the
information that may be passed to the foreign tax authority. Second, technical difficulties cause
problems with respect to the adequate supply of data, language, etc. Finally, there may be
political constraints with respect to information exchange among tax administrations and its
enforcement. Because of these problems, Tanzi notes that ... it seems naive to assume that
enhanced exchange of information among countries is the instrument that will allow countries
to cope with the exponential growth of foreign source incomes that accompanies the
increasingly deeper integration of the worlds economies (p. 84). 
Because of these practical problems with the application of the residence principle, favouring
a residence tax over a source tax appears to detach from reality. As Keen (1993) puts forward,
this pushes the real world situation towards an effective source base. Hence, source-based
capital taxes are likely to remain important in future tax systems. The rest of this study Internationalization and capital income taxation
9 We concentrate on these broader issues and do not discuss the numerous other ways in which firms respond to
special tax incentives, such as investment tax credits, allowances for investments in research and development
(R&D), special tax holidays, or the tax treatment of royalties. For a discussion of these tax incentives, see e.g.
Hines (1996b).
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concentrates on these source-based taxes on capital income, in particular corporate income
taxes. The following box lists some more fundamental arguments why governments want to tax
corporations. 
3.3 Corporate income taxes and international capital allocation
At the time that capital markets are increasingly becoming international, capital tax systems
remain very different across EU countries (see chapter 2). This induces numerous tax-induced
responses by market participants. In this section, we discuss the empirical evidence on the
impact of company taxes on investment behaviour of multinational enterprises. The next section
elaborates on the impact on profit allocation.
9
Why do countries tax corporations
Given that countries want to tax capital income, why would they want to tax it at the corporate level? The economic
literature lists the following reasons.
 Governments tax capital income because of horizontal and vertical equity. Indeed, tax systems are heavily
influenced by the idea of a comprehensive income tax in which individuals are taxed on the sum of their income
from labour and capital. These considerations would naturally result in residence-based taxes. However,
administrative complications may render these taxes impossible. For instance, as long as fiscal authorities find
it difficult to assign income from retained profits to individuals, a tax on the company level is justified for
administrative reasons. 
 Governments tax corporations on the basis of the concept of entitlement. This reflects the view that the source
country is entitled to share in the income created within its borders, including income that flows to foreign
capital owners. This concept applies especially to location-specific rents that accrue to firms operating in the
country. These rents may originate from natural resources, public infrastructure, agglomeration benefits, etc.
They can be taxed by the government without causing an immediate capital flight out of the country. Although
a pure profit tax would be more efficient to tax away these rents, it might be difficult for governments to
distinguish between the normal return to capital and pure profit. Therefore, it may rely on a uniform corporate
tax. 
 Governments can adopt the benefit principle of taxation. Economic theory suggests that, under a strict
application of the benefit principle, taxes do not distort the allocation of capital. Intuitively, whereas taxes reduce
the after-tax rate of return on capital, the benefits of public goods exactly compensate for this by raising the
before-tax rate of return. A strict application of the benefit principle is impossible, however, because
unincorporated businesses and firms that do not make profits benefit from the public goods financed out of
corporate taxes. Nevertheless, the benefit principle usually provides an important motivation for corporate
income taxes. Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
10 Rents make investment decisions responsive to the average tax rate. If these rents are location specific, however,
they can be taxed away without causing capital flight. The new economic geography literature illustrates how
industrial agglomeration create such rents (Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Kind et al., 2000).
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3.3.1 Theory
Economic theory suggests that, when capital is perfectly mobile across borders, the after-tax rate
of return to capital should be equal across countries in equilibrium, i.e.
where t1 and t2 denote source taxes in countries 1 and 2, while f(k1) and f(k2) stand for the
marginal product of capital, equal to the before-tax rates of return to capital in countries 1 and 2,
respectively. According to the arbitrage condition (3.1), differences in tax rates across countries 1
and 2 should be matched by differences in the before-tax rates of return. Since one generally
assumes decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital in production, i.e. f(k1) and f(k2) are
negative, equality in (3.1) is accomplished through changes in the capital stock. For instance, if
the two countries start from an equal tax rate and country 1 increases its tax above that in
country 2, equality in (3.1) can be maintained by a reallocation of real capital from country 1 to
country 2. The speed with which the before-tax returns to capital in both countries respond to
changes in the capital stock determines the sensitivity of international capital allocation to
source-based taxes. Note that t1 and t2 should be interpreted as the marginal effective tax rates on
capital. Indeed, not only the statutory rates but also parameters that influence the tax base
determine the after-tax rates of return on real investment.
Expression (3.1) forms the basis for most empirical studies on the impact of taxes on the
allocation of capital. Before we discuss this empirical evidence, three remarks should be made.
First, (3.1) makes no distinction between financial capital and real capital. In theory, it is the
adjustment in real capital that ensures equilibrium. The data, however, usually confound
financial and real capital. The latter can therefore not be observed directly. 
Second, (3.1) assumes that in investment decisions are taken at the margin. Devereux and
Griffith (1998a) argue, however, that investment decisions are often inframarginal. This implies
that the average rate of return and, correspondingly, the average effective tax rate should feature
in the equilibrium condition. Indeed, many empirical studies use the average effective tax rate to
explore location decisions.
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A final remark to condition (3.1) is that countries with high taxes may indirectly compensate
firms with investment incentives that are more difficult to measure. Examples are investment
subsidies or spending on infrastructure. By making private capital more productive, these
indirect measures raise the before-tax rate of return to capital. This suggests that the
combination of taxes and public spending determines international investment decisions, rather
than taxes alone.Internationalization and capital income taxation
11  This corresponds to an elasticity of 0.6 if the tax rate is set at 35%.
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3.3.2 Empirical evidence for the US
A number of studies have explored the impact of taxes on the location of FDI. Table 3.1 provides
a summary of these studies. The first is a study by Devereux (1992) on behalf of the Ruding
Committee. He provides a survey of the literature before 1992 on the impact of taxation on
international investment flows. The report concludes that at least for multinational enterprises,
taxation does appear to have a significant impact on the location of real activities.
In a recent survey of the literature, Hines (1999) suggests that time-series studies generally
find a significant impact of taxes on US direct investment abroad. In particular, according to
Hines, a value of 1.7 for the semi-elasticity of FDI to tax rates is a reasonable consensus
estimate from the literature, i.e. a 1%-point increase in the foreign tax rate reduces US
investment in a country by 1.7%.
11 Hines also argues that the elasticity of retained earnings is
probably somewhat higher than for direct transfers. 
A number of other studies use cross-section data. Grubert and Mutti (1991) explore the
sensitivity of US investors in 33 countries with respect to foreign average effective tax rates. They
find a semi-elasticity of investment of 0.3. Using the same method, Hines and Rice (1994) find
a higher semi-elasticity of 3.3. The difference in magnitudes of the Grubert-Mutti and Hines-
Rice elasticity can be explained by the use of different data. First, Hines and Rice use data for
more countries, including a number of tax havens. Second, the data used by Hines and Rice
contain all nonbank companies while Grubert and Mutti concentrate on manufacturing firms
alone. Capital flows to tax havens and by non-manufacturing firms may contain much more
financial capital than the flows analysed by Grubert and Mutti. The difference in results
therefore suggests that financial flows are typically more responsive to taxes than is real capital.
According to Altshuler et al. (1998), capital has become more responsive to taxes during the
1980s. In particular, they have data on average effective tax rates and investment in plant and
equipment by US multinationals in manufacturing in 58 countries for 1984 and 1992. Altshuler
et al. find a semi-elasticity of 1.5 in 1984 but a much larger elasticity of 2.7 for 1992. This
suggests that capital has become more responsive to taxes during this decade.
One problem in the studies mentioned above is that they might not adequately control for
omitted variables that are correlated with taxes and which potentially affect FDI. Hence, the
estimates might be biassed. Following the methodology of Slemrod (1990), Hines (1996a)
addresses the omitted variable problem by using the distinction between investment from
countries with a tax credit system and countries that adopt a tax exemption system. Investors
from tax exempt countries are taxed only under the tax of the host country and should thus
respond to high tax rates abroad. In contrast, high taxes on investors from tax credit countries
are compensated by the foreign tax credit in the home country. Since all omitted variables affect
investors from tax exempt and tax credit countries in the same way, one can control for theseInternationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
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variables by estimating the elasticity of tax exempt countries, conditional on a zero elasticity for
tax credit countries. Thus, Hines reports a fairly large elasticity of 10.
3.3.3 Evidence for Europe
Unlike for the US, studies on the impact of corporate income taxes on foreign investment in
Europe are more scarce. According to Hines (1999), this is mainly due to data limitations,
especially for property, plant and equipment. The question is whether the elasticities found for
the US carry over to the EU-economy. A recent study by Broekman en Van Vliet (2000), relying
on FDI data, suggest that they do. They estimate the impact of average effective tax rates in EU-
countries on aggregate inward FDI in these countries in the period between 1989 and 1998.
Their estimates range between 1.4 and 2.2, which is comparable with the Hines consensus
estimate of 1.7.
Devereux and Freeman (1995) use data on bilateral FDI flows between 1984-89 for five EU
countries: Germany, France, UK, Italy and the Netherlands. Together with data for the US and
Japan, Devereux and Freeman estimate the tax elasticity of FDI in two alternative forms. In
particular, they assume that multinational firms follow a two-stage decision making proces.
First, they determine the allocation of investment between domestic and total outward FDI. At
Table 3.10 Summary of studies estimating the impact of taxes on FDI
Reference Type of study Semi-elasticity of FDI
a
Devereux (1992) Survey of the literature Significant negative effect of taxes on
foreign investment
Hines (1999) Consensus estimate based on times
series models for US investment abroad
1.7 (elasticity of retained earnings
exeeds that of transfers)
Grubert and Mutti (1991) US outward investment into 33 countries
in 1982
6 0.3
Hines and Rice (1994) US outward investment into 73 countries
in 1982
6 3.3
Altshuler et al. (1998) US outward investment in 58 countries
in 1984 and 1992
6 1.5 in 1984
6 2.7 in 1992
Devereux and Freeman (1995) Panel of bilateral outward FDI in 7 OECD
countries 1984-89
6 0.4
Devereux and Griffith (1998b) Panel of US multinationals investing in
EU countries
6 0.4 for UK and 6 1.7 for France and
Germany for probability of choosing
location in that country
Broekman and van Vliet (2000) Panel of aggregate FDI inflows in EU
countries
between 1.4 and 2.2




 Percentage change in FDI in response to an absolute change in the tax rate.Internationalization and capital income taxation
39
this stage, Devereux and Freeman find that taxes are unimportant: the tax elasticity is not
significant. At the second stage, multinational firms determine how total outward FDI is
allocated across alternative locations. At this second stage, Devereux and Freeman find that taxes
do matter. In particular, the estimated coefficient of Devereux and Freeman suggest a semi-
elasticity of 0.4. 
Devereux and Griffith (1998b) confirm these findings by exploiting a panel of US
multinationals. They find that European taxes do not affect the total amount of outward FDI by
US investors as a share of total investment. However, tax differentials across EU countries do
matter for the allocation of US investment abroad across EU states. Indeed, a higher average
effective tax rate in the UK, Germany or France significantly reduces the probability of a
multinational to locate in that country. Hence, the average effective tax rate is important for the
choice of American multinationals between locations in Europe, but not for the choice whether
to invest in Europe or not. 
A recent study by Gorter and Parikh (2000) uses data for bilateral FDI in 1995-96 for eight
countries in the EU. The authors follow Hines (1996b) in controlling for omitted variables by
using the distinction between tax credit countries and tax exempt countries. For taxes, they use
the (average) effective tax rates presented in table 2.4, i.e. based on the median effective tax rate
on corporations in EU countries. The UK is the only tax credit country for which the elasticity is
assumed to be zero. Gorter and Parikh find that the semi-elasticity of FDI within the EU is 4.3
on average. This is somewhat higher than most of the elasticities found in studies for the US.
One interpretation of the relatively high elasticity may be that capital is relatively mobile within
the European Union, as compared to that between the EU and the US. Indeed, economic
integration in Europe has eliminated the technical and informational barriers to cross-border
investments that may still be present for investors from countries outside the EU. This is also in
line with the conclusions from Devereux and Freeman (1995) and Devereux and Griffith (1998)
which suggest that the investment location within Europe is more sensitive to taxes than
whether an investment takes place in Europe or not.
Table 3.2 reports the Gorter-Parikh elasticities for different EU countries. In this table, an
elasticity of 6.6 for the Netherlands means that, if some European country increases its
effective tax rate by 1%-point, Dutch investors reduce their investments in that country by 6.6%.
Table 3.2 reveals that the tax elasticity for Portugal is an outlier. Only for Denmark, taxes have
have no significant effect on FDI. For all other countries, the impact of taxes on FDI is
significantly negative and somewhere around the average of 4.3. Note that the zero elasticity of
the UK is part of the estimation procedure, which imposes a zero elasticity for countries with a
tax credit system.Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
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The various elasticities from Table 3.2. can be used to calculate the overall impact of a reduction
in the effective tax rate on inward FDI from other EU countries. This excercise is presented in
for the Netherlands in the next box. In particular, it illustrates the impact of a reduction in the
Dutch corporate income tax on inward FDI and, consequently, on the Dutch tax base. This gives
us some feeling for the size of the Gorter-Parikh elasticity. The lower part of the Box notes the
various caveats that are associated with this computation. 
3.3.4 Caveats
We may conclude that tax differentials have a significant impact on the location of FDI. It is
tricky, however, to interpret gross FDI inflows as a proxy for its contribution to gross capital
formation in a country. First, FDI confound several things such as real investment in property
plant and equipment, mergers and acquisitions, and increases in investor equity. These different
components do not have the same implications for gross capital formation in a country. For
instance, mergers and acquisitions are just a change of ownership which does not contribute
much to capital formation. The same holds true for financial capital that is not accompanied by
real capital, the so-called passive FDI.




Netherlands 6 6.6 (3,8)
France 6 4.6 (3.7)
Finland 6 4.3 (3.4)
Germany 6 2.3 (2.2)
Austria 6 1.0 (2.4)
Denmark 6 1.5 (1.4)
United Kindomg zero
Source: Gorter and Parikh (2000)Internationalization and capital income taxation
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Secondly, taxes may also have a different impact on the different components of FDI. Indeed,
Swenson (2001) explores the implications of corporate effective taxes on the distinguished
components of FDI in the US between 1984 and 1992, namely, new plants, plant expansions
and mergers and acquisitions. She finds that investment in new plant and plant expansion
respond significantly negative to taxes, with elasticities of 0.11 and 0.07, respectively. In
contrast, the impact on mergers and acquisitions is significantly positive, with an elasticity of
0.06. This latter effect might be explained by the relatively tax-favoured treatment of US-owned
firms, relative to domestically owned firms, in some high-tax countries. Swenson does not find a
significant impact of taxes on purely financial components of FDI, such as increases in investor
equity. The next Box suggests, however, that tax systems at large may have important
implications for passive FDI.
The evidence on the responsiveness of FDI to taxes is thus not equivalent to the impact of
taxes on gross capital formation. In particular, the tax effect of real capital is probably different
Effects of a reduction in the Dutch corporate income tax from 35% to 30%
Suppose the Dutch government decides to reduce the corporate income tax from 35% to 30%. At a given tax base
and starting from the effective tax rate in 1999 of 30% (see table 2.4), this would imply a reduction in the effective
tax rate by (30/35) × 5% = 4.3%. Total revenue of the Dutch corporate income tax in 1999 equals 15.5 billion euro.
By reducing the tax rate from 35% to 30%, the direct loss in tax revenue equals (5/35) × 15.5 = 2.2 billion euro. But
how large is the ex-post budgetary cost?
A reduction in the effective tax rate by 4.3%-points raises the total amount of inward FDI in the Netherlands. This
is calculated by using the Gorter-Parikh elasticities for Europe, where we assume the average elasticity of 4.3 for
countries that are not part of their study. For inward FDI from outside Europe, we take the Hines consensus
estimate of 1.7. Some straightforward calculations suggest that the 4.3% reduction in the average effective tax rate
raises total inward FDI by 18.9 billion euro. Between 1990 and 1999, the average return on invested capital of 265
Dutch companies in the Worldscope database was 9.9%. Using this figure, one can verify that the increase of
inward FDI would imply a rise in Dutch profits of 18.9×0.099 = 1.87 billion euro. This reflects the broadening of the
tax base. Taxed at a marginal rate of 30%, this yields a public revenue of 0.56 billion euro. Hence, the ex-post
budgetary cost for the government is equal to 2.2 0.56 = 1.64 billion euro, i.e. approximately 25% is earned back
through the broadening of the tax base.
When interpreting the above calculations, one should keep in mind several caveats. In particular, the calculations
ignore:
 financial decisions by multinational firms such as profit allocation and their interactions with real investment
decisions.
 general equilibrium effects on prices, wages, unemployment, etc. 
 effects on domestic investment
Hence, the calculation should be seen as an illustration of the Gorter-Parikh elasticity, not as an assessment of the
overall impact of lower corporate income taxes on the government budget.Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
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Inward FDI Outward FDI
Passive foreign direct investment
Passive FDI generally takes place through financial holding companies that receive the majority of their income from
holding securities and portfolio capital. Some countries have created attractive tax regimes for these type of
companies. For instance, financial holdings in Belgium and Luxemburg could qualify during the 1990s for a reduced
tax burden. The Netherlands also created an attractive environment for these companies. As a result, the number
of financial holding companies in the Netherlands rose between 1990 and 1999 from 6000 to more than 9000
(DNB, 2000). 
These attractive regimes for holding companies have attracted substantial amounts of (passive) FDI. Indeed, the
chart below shows the cumulative inward and outward FDI between 1990-1998 as a percentage of GDP in 1998. It
reveals that inward FDI in the Benelux countries was substantially higher than in the rest of the EU.
It is sometimes argued that financial investments are attractive for countries since these financial flows will finally
end up in real investments. However, passive investments are usually reinvested in third countries. Hence, a large
gross inflow of FDI may be accompanied by a large gross outflow, without an impact on capital formation or
employment. Indeed, the chart reveals that the large inflow of FDI in the Netherlands is accompanied by an even
larger outflow. Moreover, some figures suggest that FDI creates relatively few jobs in the Benelux countries. To
illustrate, for every $100.000 assets invested by US multinationals in German and French affiliates, there were almost
three people employed in 1998. For Belgium and the Netherlands, this is less than one employee (BEA, 2000)
Cumulative inward (left) and outward (right) FDI 1990-98 as a ratio of GDP in 1998 in the EU, Belgium-Luxemburg,
and the Netherlands
Source: OECD (2000b), IMF Financial Statistics (2000) and own calculations.Internationalization and capital income taxation
43
3.4 Effects of corporate income taxes on profit allocation
Distortions in the allocation of real investments are important for welfare since they involve the
efficient allocation of capital across countries. But taxes can also affect the international
allocation of profits of multinational firms, without relocating the underlying capital that
generates these profits. In particular, the division of income of a multinational among countries
in Europe traditionally relies on separate accounting.  This means that all permanent
establishments within a country determine their profits through accounts that terminate at the
border. However, various parts of a multinational in different countries are usually closely
connected. This complicates separate accounting, for instance when assigning shared costs and
returns. Moreover, it allows for several discretionary routes through which companies can shift
income across their affiliates in different countries. The most important routes among these are
thin capitalization and transfer pricing (see below).
The incentives for multinational firms to shift their income from one country to another are
determined by two parameters. The first is the difference between statutory tax rates which
generally apply to marginal changes in profits. Second, the incentives for income shifting
depend on whether countries adopt the exemption system or the credit system. In case of the
exemption system, there is always an incentive for income shifting as long as tax rates differ. In
case of a tax credit system, the tax benefits from income shifting depend on the possibilities for
deferring home-country tax and the application of excess foreign tax credits. In case of excess
foreign credit, there is an incentive for foreign subsidiaries to either reinvest profits in foreign
operations or simply defer taxes by not paying out dividends to the parent.
Because profit shifting does not change the allocation of real capital, it seems less
distortionary from a welfare point of view. Indeed, by shifting paper profits, a multinational only
shifts its tax liabilities form one country to another. This is primarily a distributional issue.
Profit shifting, however, may also have real effects as firms may take a joint decision about real
investment and income allocation. In particular, profit shifting can partly offset the distorting
impact of taxes on real investment decisions because high taxes are less of a disincentive to the
extent that income can be shifted out of a country. Profit shifting may also create distortions in
real investments. For instance, multinational firms may set up a financing, insurance or service
entity in low-tax countries, just to enable the corporation to route income through affiliates in
those countries. Moreover, profit shifting may frustrate the benefit principle of taxation. In fact,
firms can benefit from a high supply of public goods in countries that levy high tax rates, but at
the same time escape this tax burden by means of profit shifting to low-tax countries (Leeftink,
1999). Finally, profit shifting  crowds out human resources that could otherwise be used more
productively.Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
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3.4.1 Thin capitalization
Multinational firms can finance their foreign affiliates in different ways. To understand  the tax
implications of these different types of finance, assume a parent company in country 1 that
invests in a subsidiary in country 2. The parent company can choose between debt finance and
equity finance. In case of debt finance, the interest is tax deductible for the subsidiary in the host
country at rate t2. The interest payment from the subsidiary to the parent is taxed in the country
where the parent resides through the corporate income tax, i.e. at rate t1. In case of equity
finance, the return on capital in the subsidiary is taxed by the corporate income tax in the
country where the subsidiary is located, i.e. at a rate t2. If the parent company is located in a
country that adopts the tax exemption system, the repatriated dividend is not taxed in the home
country of the parent. Hence, firms in tax exemption countries will prefer debt finance for
subsidiaries located in countries with high statutory tax rates and prefer equity finance for
subsidiaries located in countries with low statutory tax rates. If the parent company resides in a
country that adopts the tax credit system, repatriated dividends are taxed by the corporate
income tax in the home country of the parent, while the foreign tax is credited. Hence, parent
companies in tax credit countries will be indifferent between debt finance and equity finance,
although deferral and limited access to foreign tax credits may also give an advantage to debt
finance in high-tax countries.
A simple look at the data suggests that use of intra-company loans to finance foreign
subsidiaries in high-tax countries is an important phenomenon. For instance, Weichenrieder
(1996) shows that in the early 1990s more than three quarter of German inward FDI consist of
loans while German investments abroad consists primarily of equity. This reflects the high-tax
status of Germany in Europe. Also recent econometric evidence supports these incentive effects
of taxes on the source of finance. Grubert (1998) exploits data for foreign subsidiaries of US
firms and finds a positive correlation between the statutory tax rate and the amount of interest
payments by a subsidiary. The reverse holds for dividend payments. Note that the opportunities
for multinationals to reduce their tax bill through leveraging is limited due to thin-capitalization
rules which limit the allowable debt/equity ratios.
3.4.2 Transfer pricing
Under separate accounting, transactions between entities of a company in different countries
should be traded at transfer prices. A way to shift paper profits within a multinational firm is by
manipulating these prices. Indeed, it is attractive for multinationals to charge an artificially low
price for goods that are transferred from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. This low price
would increase profitability of the affiliate in the low-tax country while it decreases profitability
of the affiliate in the high-tax country. Thus, the multinational would reduce its overall tax










Today, intra company trade is quantitatively important. To illustrate, 30% of all Dutch
industrial production is controlled by foreign parents, while this share is 15% in the service
sector. Three quarters of the imports by these foreign controlled firms involves intra company
trade, e.g. imports from the parent company or from another foreign affiliate. In aggregate,
intra-company import by foreign controlled firms amounts to146 billion guilders in 1996,
which is around 40% of total Dutch imports (CBS, 1999). These figures suggest that there is
indeed substantial scope for profit shifting through the manipulation of transfer prices.
Following the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, however, most governments have
introduced the arms-length principle to determine transfer prices. This implies that transfer
prices should be set equal to the prices that would apply to market transactions between
unrelated parties. But for a number of goods and services, there is no such outside market.
Indeed, the uniqueness of many intangibles, such as brand names and intellectual property
rights makes it impossible to determine arms-length prices. Due to asymmetric information,
firms thus have some freedom to manipulate these transfer prices, thereby reducing their
overall tax liability. This problem is likely to become more important in light of the growing
importance of intangible investments and intangible products (see figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2   Average ratio intangible/tangible investment in six EU countries (Aus, Bel, Fr, NL, UK, Sw)
Source: CBS, 2000.
Empirical studies on transfer pricing primarily rely on indirect methods to estimate the extent to
which profit shifting occurs. For instance, some studies estimate the correlation between
profitability rates of foreign affiliates of US multinationals and statutory tax rates in different
host countries, thereby using aggregate data. Thus, Grubert and Mutti (1991) find that anInternationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
12 A problem with this and other aggregate studies is, however, that the estimates may simply reflect systematic
differences in the characteristics of firms that invest in low-tax countries, rather than profit shifting. Studies using
firm-level data have more scope to control for this heterogeneity among firms, but such studies are currently not
available for Europe due to a lack of adequate data.
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increase in the tax rate by 1%-point reduces profitability by 0.26%. Hines and Rice (1994) find a
much higher elasticity of 2.3%. These findings are interpreted as indirect evidence for profit
shifting through aggressive transfer pricing. According to Hines and Rice, tax havens play an
important role for this type of tax avoidance: their calculations suggest that some tax havens
maximize total corporate tax revenue (i.e. the top of the Laffer curve) at a rate between 5 and 8%. 
An alternative way to explore transfer pricing is by using firm-level data. Harris (1993)
compares the tax liabilities of companies with a foreign affiliate in a low-tax country and those
with an affiliate in a high-tax country. The idea is that multinationals with low-tax affiliates may
reduce the tax liabilities through transfer pricing in the home country of the parent, while those
with a high-tax subsidiary are more likely to use transfer pricing to increase the domestic tax
liabilities. Harris (1993) find that firms with low-tax affiliates indeed have substantial lower
domestic tax liabilities in the US, while those with high-tax affiliates have a higher US tax bill.
Using firm-level data for 370 US multinationals, Rousslang (1997) compares the profitability
of the foreign affiliates with the average profitability of firms. He also finds empirical support
for income shifting, although he reports moderate effects: profit shifting represents less than
4% of the world-wide income of the firms under consideration.
Clausing (1998) exploits intra-firm trade data of US multinationals to test the hypothesis of
manipulation of transfer prices. She finds that taxes have a significant impact on intra-firm
trade balances. In particular, a 10% point lower tax rate in the country of the affiliate results in a
4.4% reduction in the trade balance between the parent company and the affiliate. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that US sales to affiliates in low-tax countries are underpriced
while US purchases from these affiliates are overpriced.
EU-evidence on profit shifting is rather scarce. One study by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999) shows that, in a number of European countries, banks with foreign owners have lower
tax liabilities than banks that are domestically owned. This may be interpreted as indirect
evidence for tax avoidance. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) analyse the correlation between the
complement of the labour-income share per sector (as a proxy for corporate profits) and
statutory corporate income taxes. A positive correlation is interpreted as indirect evidence for
profit shifting. Based on their estimates, the authors conclude that profit shifting is an
important phenomenon in the OECD.
12
Summing up, the scarce econometric evidence for Europe suggests that profit shifting is an
important phenomenon. In addition, multinationals openly admit that tax planning is becomingInternationalization and capital income taxation
13 See for instance http:\www.cfoeurope.com.
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an increasingly important aspect of the firm strategy.
13 A final piece of indirect evidence is the
flourishing tax consulting industry in the EU.
3.5 Conclusions
To the extent that capital markets become more integrated, tax differences may cause more
severe behavioural responses which change the international allocation of capital and profits.
Indeed, this chapter shows that corporate taxes have a significant impact on the international
allocation of investments. In particular, both US evidence and recent evidence for the EU
suggest that foreign direct investment is sensitive to differentials in the effective tax burden on
corporations with semi-elasticities ranging between 6 0.4 and 6 4.0.
Another elastic component to company taxation is the distribution of corporate profits across
affiliates in various countries. Studies for the US find indirect evidence for this phenomenon.
Also in Europe, income shifting seems important, although the magnitude of the problem is
difficult to determine. The internationalisation of businesses, the growing importance of
intangibles and intra-company trade, and developments in the Internet will probably make it
increasingly difficult for tax authorities to monitor the use of transfer pricing, thus leaving more
scope for profit shifting.Internationalization and capital income taxation Capital income taxation in Europe
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The previous chapter discusses how firms respond to differences in capital income taxation; this
chapter discusses how governments respond to each others tax setting behaviour. In particular,
internationally footloose business activity underlies international spillovers of taxation, which we
call fiscal externalities. They trigger strategic tax competition, and provide a case for tax
coordination. The gains from tax coordination should, however, be weighed against positive
effects of tax competition.
4.1 Fiscal externalities
4.1.1 Underprovision of public goods
The archetypical tax competition model is instigated by the seminal work of Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986).
14 We outline the main assumptions underlying its results, and give the
intuition behind the idea of fiscal externalities. We wont prove lemmas or theorems or discuss
the full array of variables in order to keep the mathematics to a minimum. Later in this chapter,
we discuss some qualifications to the Zodrow-Mieszkowski framework.
Consider a world of two countries inhabited by residents who each supply one unit of labour
to their home labour market, and   units of capital to the world capital market. Both countries

produce a single good -which can be thought of as national product- by employing labour and
capital according to the production function
that maps  , the per capita capital stock employed in country i, to  , per capita production.
We make no assumptions with respect to production technology, except the common ones that
the marginal capital productivity   is positive, and the change in marginal capital

productivity  is negative (decreasing returns to scale).

We are primarily interested in how tax policies determine the allocation of capital, and above
all, how tax policy in one country affects that of other countries. We will come to these issues












where   and   denote the relative sizes of the countries in terms of population (the weighting
with the population rates is necessary since the capital labour ratio is expressed at the level of an
individual resident rather than the level of the country as a whole).
The good can be consumed in two ways: as  ,  a private good, or as  , a public good. The
private good is (implicitly) distributed through the market. The public good must, however, be
provided by the government. To this end it raises revenue by applying a tax rate   to  . Hence, -
the tax base is the capital stock employed within the countrys borders, i.e. the tax is a source
tax. Had the tax base been  , the capital stock owned by residents at home or abroad, then the

tax would have been a residence tax In chapter 3 we argued that, although residence based taxes
are to be preferred from a theoretical perspective, source based taxes are the rule due to
problems of monitoring foreign source capital income. Hence, the models tax structure is a
reasonable representation of reality.
Residents value both private and public consumption. Their preferences are summarised by
the utility function
which has the usual properties  . It is the governments task to choose the
tax rate such that residents enjoy an optimal mix of private and public consumption. Formally, it
should choose a tax rate such that
This condition for optimal fiscal policy can be understood as follows: There is an objective trade-
off between private and public consumption: public consumption inevitably goes at the cost of
private consumption, the marginal rate of transformation. There is, however, also a subjective
trade-off: public consumption is valued in terms of private consumption according to  ,
the marginal rate of substitution. Condition (4.4) says that these trade-offs must be in balance,
i.e. the marginal rate of transformation must equal the marginal rate of substitution. If this
condition does not hold, public consumption is either too cheap or too expensive, and residents
would be better off if the government respectively set a higher or lower tax rate. Solving
condition (4.4) for the tax rate   yields a function that defines the optimal tax rate   given the - -
tax rate   of the other government. This best-response function underlines the strategic -
interdependence of the governments: they cannot afford to make fiscal policy disregarding theTax competition
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Welfare improving tax coordination
Nash equilibrium in tax rates
Best response function country j




fiscal policy of their opponent. This crucial element of tax competition is the consequence of the
international nature of the capital market.
It can be demonstrated that, if the capital market is perfectly competitive, the gross return to
capital equals the marginal capital productivity, and the net return r equals the marginal
productivity less the tax rate. Assuming that capital is perfectly mobile, the residents of both
countries supply their capital wherever the net return is highest. Hence, the market equilibrium
condition is
This capital arbitrage condition already featured in chapter 3. There we explained the
corresponding equilibrium is stable: self-interested behaviour of individual investors drives the
international allocation of capital towards a state in which equation (4.5) holds true.
If both governments are to choose their optimal tax rate given the tax rate of the other
government, then neither government has an incentive to change its fiscal policy -they find
themselves in a Nash equilibrium. It corresponds to the intersection of the best response curves
defined by condition (4.4).
Figure 4.1   Best response functions of two countries competing for mobile capital
Figure 4.1 sketches the best response functions of country i and country j graphically, that is,
the optimal tax rates given the tax rate of the other country. Note that the optimal tax is non-zero
for a zero tax rate of the opponent (the functions do not start in the origin). Moreover, theTax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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optimal tax rate increases in the tax rate of the opponent (the functions are upward sloping). The
only point where both countries simultaneously behave optimally is the intersection of the best
response functions. This is the Nash equilibrium.
It can be demonstrated that the tax game that governments play against each other
resembles a standard prisoners dilemma. Thus, in the Nash equilibrium, the level of   is
lower than it would have been had the governments set their tax rates cooperatively. It is for this
reason that supra-national bodies such as the European Commission favour tax coordination.
The intuition behind this result revolves around capital flight.
The residents budget constraint implies that private consumption equals the sum of their 
labour and capital income. The first is simply the difference between the national product and
the remuneration of the suppliers of capital; the second the product of the net rate of return and
the capital stock
Public consumption equals the product of the tax rate and the tax base
How does an increase in one countrys tax rate impact upon private  consumption of the other
country? Differentiating (4.6) with respect to   yields the answer: -
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4.8) says that wages will increase in country i.
The intuition is that the tax increase induces capital flight from country j to country i. 
Consequently, labour in country i will have more capital to work with, and becomes more
productive. Private consumption in country i increases on this account. The second term says
that the net return to capital decreases. As long as individual countries have a negligible impact
on world interest rates, however, this second term is zero. Therefore, private consumption in
country i increases if country j raises its tax rate.
We can perform a similar exercise for public consumption. Differentiating (4.7) with respect
to   yields: -Tax competition










Expression (4.9) reveals that tax revenue in country i increases due to a broadening of the tax
base. Thus, public consumption also increases.
In short, an increase of the tax rate in country j increases both private and public
consumption in country i. Thus, taxation involves an unambiguous positive externality. Since
the government of neither country takes this externality into account while making its fiscal
policy, they set their tax rates lower than it would otherwise have done. This implies that public
good consumption is also lower than it would otherwise have been, and that residents of both
countries would be better off if their governments would increased their tax rates in unison. In
figure 4.1, this is indicated by the arrow labelled welfare increasing tax coordination.
Zodrow and Mieszkowski initiated a vast literature that extends and generalises their original
idea.
15 Hoyt (1991), for instance, shows that there is a positive relationship between the number
of competing regions and the magnitude of the fiscal externality. This suggest that downward
pressure on tax rates will increase with the advent of EU enlargement.
Others have emphasised that tax competition can be especially harmful for poor households
since it increases the costs of income redistribution from the rich to the poor (Huber, 1999).
The intuition behind this result is that high wage earners tend to own relatively much capital.
Consequently, tax competition frustrates income redistribution. Tax coordination eases the
efficiency-equity trade-off.
4.1.2 Pecuniary externalities
Bucovetski (1991) qualifies the Zodrow-Mieszkowski result in case  , i.e. if countries differ g
in size. Then, the large country has an incentive to set its tax rate differently from the small
country. Intuitively, the large country possesses market power -- or monopsony power -- on the
international capital market: it can influence the world interest rate by its tax policy. For
instance, a higher tax in the large country reduces the demand for capital in that country, which
has a non-negligible impact on world capital demand. Accordingly, the world interest rate
declines. This benefits welfare in the large country if it is a net importer of capital (as in the
Bucovetski model). Similarly, if the large country is a net capital exporter, it can improve welfare
of its residents by reducing its tax rate in order to raise the world interest rate.
The welfare gain in the large country typically comes at the expense of other countries. For
instance, if the large country is a capital importer, the lower interest rate induced by its high tax
rate would hurt capital owners abroad. As the large country does not take into account theTax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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adverse welfare effects on foreigners, it involves an externality: the so-called pecuniary
externality. Note that the impact of the pecuniary externality on the tax rate can be opposite from
the fiscal externality. Indeed, the pecuniary externality may either alleviate or exacerbate the
underprovision of public goods by yielding either a too high or a too low tax rate on capital.
The pecuniary externality may not only refer to large countries. Gordon and Varian (1989)
argue that also small countries can have market power on international capital markets, even
though they cannot influence the world rate of return to capital. In particular, if the rate of
return is uncertain and return patterns cannot be duplicated in other countries, investors may
gain from internationally diversifying their portfolios. In that case, all countries have some
market power which provides incentives to impose taxes on the source basis.
With respect to small and large countries, there can be other differences as well. Kanbur and
Keen (1996) show that small countries may actually gain from tax competition, relative to tax
coordination. In particular, if the small country sets a lower tax rate than the large country, it
attracts so much capital relative to its size that its residents are better off under a regime of tax
competition than under a regime of tax coordination. For the large country, the opposite holds: a
lower tax rate attracts so little capital relative to its size so that it is hardly rewarding for large
countries to cut their taxes. This can explain why small countries, such as Ireland and
Luxembourg, set relatively low tax rates compared to large countries. Moreover, it explains why
small countries are usually reluctant to sign EU tax treaties, while large, high tax countries such
as Germany and Italy generally press for them.
4.1.3 Tax exportation externalities
Countries usually both import and export capital. Indeed, gross capital flows are substantially
larger than net flows. With increased capital market integration, this cross-ownership of capital
tends to become more and more important. If the domestic capital stock is to a large extent
foreign-owned, the corporate income tax becomes an effective tool to tax foreign investors.
Governments thus face an incentive to beggar their neighbour by taxing foreign-owned
businesses in their country, which pays for public goods of benefit to the residents in the
country. This phenomenon is generally referred to as tax exportation. 
Tax exportation constitutes another fiscal externality. In particular, taxes on foreign-owned
capital reduce the earnings received by foreign investors or, to the extent that these taxes are
credited against foreign taxes, the tax revenue in foreign countries. This causes adverse welfare
effects in other countries which is not taken into account when individual countries determine
their tax rates non-cooperatively. The tax exportation externality provides an incentive for
governments to set too high tax rates on capital. Just as the pecuniary externality, it may alleviate
the underprovision of public goods.Tax competition
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Tax exportation is possible only if capital cannot fully escape the tax burden by moving
abroad, i.e. if capital is not perfectly mobile internationally. This implies that tax exportation is
probably more important in the short run than in the long run.
4.1.4 Asymmetric information
A fourth international spillover effect can arise on the micro level and has to do with asymmetric
information between firms and the government. Suppose that a multinational firm wants to
invest somewhere in Europe. In contrast to the multinational, the fiscal authorities of the
various EU countries do not know the sensitivity of the investment project to tax rates. This
information asymmetry is important in the negotiations between the fiscal authorities and the
investor about the discretionary tax treatment of the firm. In particular, the firm can exploit its
information advantage to obtain a better tax deal with competing governments. Osmundsen et
al. (1999) indeed show that the firm can realize a profit due to its information advantage
regarding the mobility of its investment. If the various governments would coordinate their
actions, the firm would have less power to exploit this information advantage.
4.2 Some qualifications
Economic theory thus gives at least four reasons why tax competition among jurisdictions fails.
It must be noted, however, that these failures of tax competition depend on a number of
important assumptions. These include:
(1) capital is mobile internationally;
(2) labour is immobile internationally;
(3) tax revenue must (at least partly) be generated by source taxes on capital income;
(4) public goods comprise only public consumption goods or transfers;
(5) governments are benevolent maximisers of social welfare;
(6) governments are credible.
Violation of these assumptions relaxes the market failures associated with tax competition. We
discuss them in turn.
4.2.1 Degree of capital-market integration
The empirical evidence on the degree of capital mobility is inconclusive. On the one hand, a
number of empirical studies suggest that capital is rather immobile internationally. For
instance, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) show that domestic savings and investments are almost
perfectly correlated, which hints at a lack of capital market integration. In addition, interest-rate
differentials and evidence on home biases of asset portfolios suggest that capital markets are not
yet perfectly integrated. On the other hand, in chapter 3 we reviewed a number of empirical
studies that point at a significant impact of taxation on the international allocation of capital. InTax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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any event, the EU internal market and the EMU progress, and capital will probably become
more mobile in the foreseeable future. Compared to the EU internal market, however, global
capital markets tend to be somewhat less integrated.
Mobility may differ between various types of capital and between the short run and the long
run. In particular, financial capital tends to be more mobile than real capital. Indeed, the latter is
usually fixed in the short run. In the long run, the distinction between financial and real capital
gets blurred. Hence, Zodrow and Mieszkowskis underprovision of public goods should be
interpreted as a long run phenomenon, whereas inefficiently high rates due to tax exportation is
more important in the short run.
4.2.2 Household mobility
The Maastricht treaty of the EU introduced the subsidiarity principle, suggesting that
government functions should be centralised only if they cannot be fulfilled satisfactory by the
individual member states. Hence, the EU tends to favour decentralisation over centralisation.
Economists generally support decentralisation. One important benefit, so they argue, is that
local governments have better information about local preferences. In particular, by voting for
local governments, residents reveal their preferences for the supply of local public goods.
Accordingly, the mix of taxes and expenditures set by the local government will better reflect the
preferences of residents in the region than in case of central governments. Indeed, central
governments typically fail to differentiate across regions and supply the same amount of public
goods to all regions. This yields efficiency losses to most regions, especially for those with
exceptional preferences. 
Tiebout (1956) suggests an alternative way to reveal household preferences for local public
goods, namely voting by feet. In particular, mobile households will choose the region in which
the tax-expenditure mix best reflects their preferences. Tiebout suggests that interjurisdictional
competition results in some sort of market solution for an efficient mix of taxes and public
expenditures in all regions.
Wellisch (2000) demonstrates that the necessary assumptions for Tiebouts hypothesis to
hold are quite restrictive. Interjurisdictional competition fails if households are immobile, and if
there are interregional externalities. In that case, central intervention is can be welfare
enhancing. Since, household mobility across EU member states is almost zero, the latter case
seems the most relevant for the EU. This is the starting point of this chapter where we discuss
the various market failures associated with tax competition between countries.
4.2.3 Second-best taxation
If capital is perfectly mobile then the incidence of a capital income tax in small open economies
falls upon immobile factors such as labour. Hence, both capital and labour income taxes are
borne by labour alone. Since the capital income tax discourages investment, small openTax competition
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economies should refrain from raising revenue in this inefficient instrument to raise revenue
(Gordon, 1986).
Zodrow and Mieszkowski consider no tax instruments other than those on capital income.
Would the government have access to other, more efficient tax instruments, then fiscal
externalities from capital taxes might disappear from the model. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991),
however, show that fiscal externalities remain important in this case. In particular, countries
find it optimal to set low tax rates on labour in order to raise domestic labour supply. This boosts
the marginal productivity of capital and thus attracts mobile capital from neighbouring
countries. Hence, the fiscal externality is now reflected in too low labour taxes. 
In practice, we do observe source taxes on capital in small open economies. One reason is
that more efficient tax instruments are politically not acceptable to the public. The English poll
tax riots are a case in point. Therefore, governments have to rely on other, less efficient taxes,
including source taxes on capital (see also chapter 3).
4.2.4 Public consumption versus public inputs
The formalized framework in this chapter does not distinguish different kinds of public goods.
Yet, recreational payments or social services differ fundamentally from infrastructure or
education: the first kind does not increase the marginal productivity of capital, whereas the
second kind does. Hence, the provision of public inputs compensates the adverse effects of
capital taxes on foreign investment. 
Keen and Marchand (1997) show, however, that tax competition will typically cause a
distortion in the composition of public spending. In particular, the supply of public
consumption will be too small relative to the supply of public inputs. Accordingly, a reallocation
of public goods from public inputs to public consumption in all countries would yield an
efficiency gain. This issue raises an important point, namely, that tax competition is harmful for
public goods such as recreation and social services but not for others such as education and
infrastructure. In fact, the latter may be overprovided because governments may compete with
the supply of these public inputs (such as airports, railways, etc) in order to attract particular
types of businesses.
4.2.5 Benevolent maximiser of social welfare
The tax competition literature starts from the assumption that governments are benevolent
maximisers of social welfare, thereby taking into account the preferences of their residents. The
public choice literature, in contrast, has a radically different perception of how the policy making
process works. In particular, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that governments generally
lack accountability, especially higher levels of government. Therefore, there is room for policy
makers to pursue their own personal goals, rather than serving the interest of the public. The
personal interest of policy makers will typically result in too high public expenditures. Indeed,Tax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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public choice economists often assume a Leviathan-type government that is an untrustworthy
revenue maximiser. Accordingly, governments have the tendency to set tax rates that are too
high from a social point of view. In that case, tax competition will serve the valuable task of
taming the Leviathan. In particular, it forces governments to reduce taxes, which improves the
conditions for an efficient mix of taxes and public expenditures (McLure, 1986). 
Edwards and Keen (1996) try to reconcile the two opposing views on governments. They
develop a model of tax competition where the government is characterized by properties of both
the benevolent maximiser of social welfare and the Leviathan revenue maximiser. Hence, the
cost of tax competition related to fiscal externalities should be weighed in the Edwards-Keen
model against the gains of tax competition associated with the disciplining impact on the
Leviathan. Edwards and Keen thus derive an explicit condition regarding government behaviour
the under which tax competition harms social welfare. In particular, welfare increases only if the
fraction of government spending that represents pure waste exceeds the responsiveness of
capital to taxes. Hence, if capital is very elastic, tax competition is unlikely to be beneficial since
this requires a very high fraction of the Leviathan-component of public spending.
In practice, it is very hard to find evidence in support of the Leviathan hypothesis. In the
wake of Oates (1985), many authors have sought to pin down the Leviathan government
empirically, but have for the most part failed. It is therefore difficult to apply the Edwards-Keen
result to the real world. One may also question whether forgoing tax competition is the
appropriate means to tame the Leviathan. Would more direct instruments to improve the
accountability of governments not be better? In the absence of first-best instruments, however,
tax competition may a welcome second-best means to discipline bureaucrats and alleviate
government failures. The challenge is, therefore, to find a balance between tax competition and
tax coordination.
4.2.6 Credibility of government
Another type of government failure has to do with time inconsistency. Investors have to make a
decision how much to invest in a particular country. These investments often require set-up
costs, investments in human capital of local employees, or research and development. These
costs are sunk after they have been made. The company will aim to finance these costs by
making quasi-rents on their investments in later periods. But governments may have an
incentive to tax away these quasi-rents since the investments cannot be relocated easily. This
creates a hold-up problem since the government cannot credibly pre-commit to companies that
it will not tax them in later periods. Firms will therefore underinvest in the country. 
Tax competition and the threat of a bad reputation can relax the time-inconsistency problem.
This is because investors realize that governments who are disciplined by tax competition have
less freedom to tax away quasi rents. Indeed, such a tax will be costly due to adverse reputationTax competition
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effects which cause a reduction in future investments. Accordingly, tax competition increases
the credibility of governments and, therefore, raises investments by firms.
Note that also current practices aim to alleviate the hold-up problem. In particular, tax
administrations use advance pricing agreements and advance tax rulings in which they provide a
commitment to firms regarding the future application of transfer prices or tax exemptions. This
commitment encourages firms to invest in a country.
4.3 Evidence on tax competition
A natural question that arises is whether the theory on tax competition is relevant in practice?
This section provides some evidence as the present situation is characterized by a virtual lack of
tax coordination.
4.3.1 Is there a tax race to the bottom?
Chapter 2 shows that statutory corporate income tax rates have declined during the last decade.
Indeed, the appendix to chapter 2 suggests that, on average over the 15 EU member states, the
statutory corporate income tax fell from around 38% in 1990 to 33% in 2000. A number of EU
countries have proposed further cuts in statutory rates in the near future. For instance,
Denmark has reduced its rate in 2001 from 32% to 30%. In Germany, the corporate tax on
retained profits will be cut from 40% to 25% and that on distributed profits from 30% to 25%.
In France and Italy, the corporate tax rate is expected to fall by 3.6%-points and 13%-points,
respectively. Ireland intends to lower its rate from 24% in 2000 to 12,5% in 2003 (see also the
next box).
Chapter 2 shows that effective tax rates on corporations in Europe have, in contrast to
statutory tax rates, not declined. This holds true, irrespective of the measure of the effective tax
rate. In fact, table 2.4 shows that the mean effective tax rate has increased by 1.1%-points
between 1990 and 1999. Note, however, that this is for a large part attributable to the increase
of the Greek tax rate from 11% in 1990 to 35% in 1999.
In short, statutory tax rates have decreased, but effective tax rates have remained constant.
How can this be reconciled with tax competition theory? As we explained in chapter 3,
differences in statutory tax rates determine the incentives for profit shifting. The decrease of
statutory tax rates points at the relative mobility of paper profits. Differences in effective tax rates
determine the incentives for the location of real capital. The constancy of effective tax rates thus
points at the relative immobility of real capital. There is, however, another reason why effective
tax rates remain constant. On the one hand, capital market integration causes downward
pressure on effective tax rates through the fiscal externality. On the other hand, it increasesTax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
16  To illustrate, Statistics from De Nederlandsche Bank (2000) reveal that foreign ownership of capital in the
Netherlands has doubled from approximately 400 billion euro in 1994 to 800 billion euro in 1998. Today,
approximately 30% of all capital in the Netherlands is foreign owned.
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cross-ownership of capital, thereby increasing the incentive for tax exportation
16. The constancy
of effective tax rates reveals that the incentive to decrease tax rates through the fiscal externality,
and the incentive to increase tax rates through tax exportation cancel out. Simulations with a
CGE model by Thalmann et al. (1996) confirm this observation.
4.3.2 Do small countries have lower tax rates than large countries?
Tax competition theory suggests that small countries set lower tax rates than large countries.
Kanbur and Keen (1993) explain why: small countries attract more capital relative to their own
size by reducing their tax rate. Thus, lower tax rates by small countries constitutes indirect
evidence for tax competition.
The difference between statutory tax rates of small and large countries are modest (see the
appendix of chapter 2). In particular, for the big five EU member states (France, Germany, UK,
Italy and Spain), the statutory tax rate on retained profit is, on average, 3% higher than for the
small member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden). To be precise, the averages are 35% and 32%, respectively in
2000. For distributed profits, the difference is even smaller due to the lower tax rate on
distributed profits in the German split rate system.
The difference in effective tax rates between large and small countries is more pronounced.
Table 2.4 shows that, calculated over the years between 1990 and 1999, the mean effective tax
rate of small countries is 24.6%, while the mean effective tax rate of large countries is no less
The case of Ireland
For the first time in history Ireland has experienced net immigration. Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons is that
Ireland has developed rapidly. Some facts: between 1987 and 1997 GDP has grown at more than double the rate of
the US, while employment has increased by almost one fourth (Barry 1999). There is a wide array of explanations
for Irelands favourable development. Krugman (1997) points at a reduction of transport costs, which pulled Ireland
out of the geographical periphery. Honohan (1998) points at the flair and adaptability of Irelands labour force,
which are apt cultural institutions for the booming computer-related services. Finally, Sachs (1997) points at the
role of foreign direct investment as the motor of economic development. Indeed,  half of Irelands manufacturing
employment is now in foreign controlled corporations, especially from the US. Tax incentives such as a special 10%
corporation tax rate for manufacturing companies, exemption from local and capital gains taxes, as well as generous
depreciation allowances have played an important role in attracting this foreign direct investment. Ireland will,
moreover, press on with building an attractive fiscal climate for foreign direct investment. It is committed to reduce
its corporate tax rate on all companies to 12.5% in 2003.Tax competition
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than  35.8%. The difference between small and large countries has declined, however, over the
last ten years from 10.8% in 1990 to 8.5% in 1999.
An alternative explanation for the observed difference between the tax rates of small and
large countries is the lack of international loss compensation. This makes locating business
activity in large countries relatively attractive This puts large countries at an advantage in
attracting investments from multinational firms since the loss of an affiliate can be offset
against profits elsewhere in the large country, not against profits in a small neighbouring
country. For this reason, large countries can set higher taxes than small countries without
immediately losing capital.
4.3.3 Strategic interactions
Zodrow-Mieszkowski-type models yield best response functions where the optimal tax rate of
one jurisdiction depends on the tax rates of by neighbouring jurisdictions. Figure (4.1) shows
two of these functions. A number of scholars have estimated the slope parameter. Brückner and
Saavedra (1999) show that property taxes on businesses set by municipalities in the state of
Massachusetts significantly responds to the tax rates of neighbouring municipalities. Similarly,
Büttner (2000) finds evidence for significant reactions of local governments in setting their
business taxes in municipalities of Baden-Württemberg. Indeed, tax competition among local
jurisdictions is present.
We are unaware of a similar research on strategic interactions for EU member states. It is,
nevertheless, likely that strategic interaction is present. First, governments typically justify tax-
rate reductions on the basis of developments in neighbouring countries. Secondly, convergence
of effective tax rates (see table 2.4) is suggestive of tax competition.
4.3.4 Preferential tax regimes
When deriving evidence on tax competition from aggregate variables (such as effective tax rates),
one important critique is that this does not do justice to the specific forms in which tax
competition works. In particular, the aggregate figures hide preferential tax regimes which can
be seen as forms of tax competition. For instance, countries have introduced special regimes to
attract investment in specific geographical areas or activities (Ireland, Spain, Greece) or created
special holding-company schemes which allow international capital income to flow through
these companies with low taxation (Benelux, Denmark, France). Other tax regimes lack
transparency or suffer from a lax enforcement of tax rules. Tax competition manifests itself
through this type of practices which both the OECD and the EU have labelled harmful tax
practices.Tax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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4.4 Measuring the gains of tax coordination
We have seen that tax competition theory as well as empirical evidence provide a case for tax
coordination. Countries underprovide public goods because tax competition prompts them to
set tax rates that are too low from a communitarian perspective. Pecuniary externalities make
things worse by distorting the international allocation of capital. Moreover, statutory tax rates
have declined significantly, harmful tax practices abound in various EU member states, and
casual observation as well as econometric research suggest that governments do strategically
respond to each others tax setting behaviour.
The case for tax coordination must, however, not be overstated. There is a range of
considerations that qualify the theoretical results. For one thing, if governments are less
benevolent than is usually assumed, then the impact of tax coordination on welfare becomes
ambiguous. For another, if capital is immobile, tax coordination constitutes an unnecessary
infringement upon the sovereignty of individual countries. Even if capital is mobile, tax
competition is not as bad as it seems, because tax exportation mitigates -or even
counterbalances- the pressure on tax rates. Indeed, effective tax rates have remained constant
during the last decade.
Welfare analysis confirms this balanced conclusion: there is a positive impact; it is, however,
relatively small due to the opposing effects. Fuente and Gardner (1990), and Sørensen (2000)
are run computer simulations with applied general equilibrium models that capture the
interdependence of the main variables featuring in the discussion on tax competition and tax
coordination. In essence, their models are extensions of the archetypical tax competition model
outlined above. Both models take account of the regional character of the EU, which operates in
a global economically integrated environment. Key parameters in the models have been
calibrated on the basis of common sense, crude data, and empirical studies. The models focus
on the allocation of real capital and thus ignore the impact of taxes on profit allocation.
Moreover, the models consider only the static long-term effects of the reallocation of capital, and
do not capture the transitory or short-term effects of tax harmonization. In Sørensens model,
however, part of the capital stock is assumed fixed, an assumption that is probably more
important in the short run. The quantitative estimates in the two studies should not be taken too
literally. They do, however, shed light on the comparative welfare gains of different forms of tax
harmonisation and on the key assumptions that drive the results.
Table 4.1 summarises the results reported by Fuente and Gardner (1990) and Sørensen
(2000). Fuente and Gardner conclude that complete harmonization of EU tax rates increases
EU output by 2.1%. The main reason behind this result is that Fuente and Gardner assume that
the EU will harmonise the tax rate at a relatively low level. This would lead to a net inflow of
capital from the rest of the world. Accordingly, the welfare gain experienced by the EU comes at
the expense of welfare losses in the US and Japan. It should be noted that this form of taxTax competition
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coordination is peculiar in the light of tax competition theory, which, as we have seen,
emphasises that tax coordination should alleviate the problem of under rather than overtaxation.
In this respect, Fuente and Gardner emphasise that the main point is that the level around
which the effective corporate tax rates are harmonized are crucial for the magnitude and even
the sign of the gains from tax harmonization.
They also conclude that the gains from tax coordination accrue particularly to the large
countries in the EU. Indeed, the five largest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK and
Spain) experience a welfare gain of 2.2%, on average. Some smaller countries, such as
Luxembourg and Ireland, even lose under a regime of tax coordination, relative to tax
competition. On average, the welfare gain for the seven smaller EU counties (Belgium,
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal) is a modest 0.4%. 
Sørensen estimates the welfare gain from tax harmonisation with the TAXCOM model at
0.15% of GDP. This figure is much smaller than found by Fuente and Gardner. One important
reason is that, whereas the effective tax rate in Fuente and Gardner declines under a regime of
tax harmonisation, the tax rate rises in the TAXCOM model. Accordingly, tax harmonisation in
TAXCOM causes an outflow of capital from Europe to the rest of the world. Despite of this
outflow of capital, Sørensen reports a welfare gain. This is due to the positive welfare
implications of a more equitable income distribution. In particular, the increase in the corporate
income tax rate in all EU countries by around 5%-points on average, allows for higher transfers
to the poor and thus a more equitable income distribution. More specifically, the gains from tax
harmonisation accrue to residents who are relatively worse off: the poorest quintile of the
residents of the representative country will profit as much as 7.6% whereas the richest quintile
loses 1.9%. 
Another source of welfare improvement in Sørensens model is that, by acting cooperatively,
the EU is better able to exploit its market power on world capital markets. Indeed, by raising the
tax burden on capital, it shifts the economic burden of government interference to suppliers of
capital from the US and Japan who receive a lower return on their capital. Without cooperation,
the EU does not exploit this opportunity.
Sørensen investigates the sensitivity of his results to changes a number of assumptions in
his TAXCOM model. First, his simulations suggest that if all countries harmonize then the gain
from tax coordination increases to 0.94%, i.e. more than six times the welfare gain under
European tax coordination. The reason is capital no longer flies to the rest of the world.Tax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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Table 4.1 also presents sensitivity analysis with respect to some crucial parameters in the model.
First, it matters whether one assumes that aggregate savings respond to changes in the after-tax
return to capital. In particular, the benchmark simulation assumes an interest elasticity of
saving of 0.4. Hence, as tax harmonization is associated with a higher tax rate in the EU, it
reduces savings, thereby causing a decline in welfare. If the interest elasticity of savings would
be zero, this adverse welfare effect disappears and the welfare gain of European tax coordination
shoots up from 0.15% to 0.43%. 
Second, it matters whether or not the government has a strong preference for redistribution.
If the preference for income equality among households doubles compared to the benchmark
simulation, then the welfare gain of regional tax coordination increases to 0.58%. 
Finally, the benchmark simulation assumes that there are two types of capital: mobile and
immobile capital. Mobile capital is can move freely across both European borders and between
the EU and other regions in the world. If this latter assumption is relaxed and the substitution
elasticity between capital from inside and outside the EU is set at 4 rather than infinity,
Sørensen finds that the welfare gain from EU tax harmonisation triples to 0.48%.
In short, model simulations suggest that the gain of EU-tax coordination is between virtually
zero and 2% of GDP. These welfare gains are, however, unequally distributed. First, large and
high-tax countries typically gain more than small and low-tax countries. Second, the gains from
tax coordination are likely to be unequally distributed over poor and rich residents within
countries. For instance, in the TAXCOM model, the poor gain while the rich are worse off. This
unequal distribution of the welfare effects of tax harmonization constitutes an important
impediment to its implementation.
Table 4.12 The welfare gains from EU tax harmonization in % of GDP
Fuente and Gardner (1990) Sørensen (2000)
Overall effect 2.1 0.15
- small countries 0.4
- large countries 2.2
Sensitivity analysis
Global tax harmonization 6 0.94
Interest elasticity of saving is zero 6 0.43
Preference for redistribution is doubled 6 0.58
Capital mobility between the EU and the
rest of the world is imperfect 6 0.48Tax competition
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4.5 Conclusions
Tax competition theory suggests that countries underprovide public goods because the threat of
capital flight prompts them to set tax rates that are too low from a communitarian perspective.
In addition, differences between countries cause differences in equilibrium tax rates, and thus
an inefficient international allocation of capital. Empirical evidence supports tax competition
theory: statutory tax rates have steadily declined and preferential tax regimes abound in various
EU member states.
There are, however, a number of qualifications. Tax competition disciplines inefficient
governments, capital immobility removes the need for tax coordination, and tax exportation
mitigates the downward pressure on tax rates. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that tax
competition for real capital is absent: effective tax rates have remained constant during the last
decade.
Whether tax coordination is desirable depends on the trade-off between its costs and
benefits, relative to the current situation which is characterized by very little coordination.
Simulations with applied general equilibrium models suggest that a move towards tax
coordination, on balance, leads to a welfare gain. It is, however, small, somewhere between 0-
2% of national income. Moreover, the welfare effects are unevenly distributed: large, high-tax
countries and poor households are the winners; small, low-tax countries and wealthy households
the losers. Political agreement on  tax coordination is for this reason unlikely without side
payments. 
In short, theory and evidence do not yield a general case for tax coordination. The case for tax
coordination is more subtle since fiscal externalities manifest themself in particular areas, not in
others, while tax competition also has some virtues in the presence of an imperfect political
system. Moreover, the assessment of tax coordination should not focus solely on fiscal
externalities: there are additional costs and benefits. On the one hand, tax coordination infringes
upon the sovereignty of individual countries. Any restriction on their fiscal discretion implies
that countries can no longer tailor their tax systems to the preferences of their residents. On the
other hand, harmonisation of rules implies that the European tax maze will become simpler,
and therefore cheaper to operate. The assessment of tax coordination on the basis of a more
comprehensive set of criteria is the topic of the next chapter.Tax competition Capital income taxation in Europe
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5 Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation
The previous chapter points out that the question is not so much whether countries should
coordinate company taxes in Europe, but rather how they should do it. This chapter assesses the
most important proposals on the basis of four criteria.
5.1 Current forms of tax coordination
Some form of tax coordination already exists: there are bilateral tax treaties for information
exchange, transfer prices, and the avoidance of international double taxation; furthermore, there
are multilateral agreements such as the OECD Model Tax Convention and Transfer Pricing
Guidelines, and the EU directives on mergers, foreign source profits, interest and royalties, as
well as an arbitration convention.
More recently, the EU agreed upon a code of conduct with respect to harmful tax practices.
This code intends to curb marginal administrative practices conspicuously intended to attract
particular kinds of business activity. More specifically, the code defines harmful tax practices as
measures that (1) affect, or may affect, in a significant way the location of business activity in
the Community, and (2) provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including
zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in question. The
code adds that Member States commit themselves not to introduce new harmful tax practices,
and to re-examining their established practices (European Commission, 1998).
The EU has, in order to promote peer pressure, established a code of conduct working
group. This group, chaired by the British paymaster general Dawn Primarolo, has blacklisted 66
harmful tax practices (Council of the European Union, 1999). Territories such as the Isle of
Man and Gibraltar account for 26 practices. Of the regular member states, the Netherlands
appears to be the culprit, since it accounts for ten of the remaining forty. This is, however,
mainly due to the codification of its advance ruling system.
The code of conduct is a non binding form of tax coordination: it relies upon peer pressure
among member states to provide the incentive for scrapping tax practices that are the odd one
out in a tax code. There are signs that this peer pressure is successful. The Netherlands, for
example, take the edge of their advance ruling system, while Ireland scraps the reduced
corporate income tax rate for manufacturing companies. However, the Netherlands contemplate
to reduce their corporate income tax rate, while Ireland is committed to reduce hers.
Accordingly, the code of conduct may intensify, rather than relax, tax competition. 
This raises the question whether harmful tax practices are indeed more harmful than tax
competition per se. The answer is ambiguous. Diaw and Gorter (2001) formally demonstrate
that the code does not necessarily alleviate undertaxation. On the one hand, it inducesAssessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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governments to scrap harmful tax practices; on the other, it prompts them to compete with the
general tax rate. The conclusion is that only under mild tax competition is the code likely to be
successful. Intuitively, only then the loss of tax revenue due to a decrease of the general tax rate -
which is necessary for compliance to the code- is relatively small.
The question remains whether further reaching proposals are desirable? One could in
particular think of tax harmonisation, which differs from tax coordination in that it necessarily
makes tax systems more similar across countries. The next section discusses a number of
proposals in this direction.
5.2 Proposals for tax harmonisation
It is infeasible to discuss the comprehensive array of tax harmonisation proposals. To keep this
chapter conveniently arranged, we stick to a small number of archetypical ones. These are non-
utopian, that is, it must be conceivable that they will be implemented in the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, they focus on primarily international aspects of taxation. They can be ordered
under three headings: harmonisation of tax bases, harmonisation of tax rates, and
harmonisation of both. We relegate more fundamental proposals to a box.
5.2.1 Harmonisation of tax bases
Multinational companies in the EU are burdened with the ins and outs of 15 distinct tax codes.
Harmonisation of the tax base -often called common base taxation- would make the EU tax
maze a lot simpler. Although this is true for multinational corporations, it makes no sense for
Fundamental tax reform
In discussions on tax harmonization in the EU, economists suggest alternative systems of capital income taxation,
such as the allowance for corporate equity (ACE), the cash-flow tax, and the comprehensive business income tax
(CBIT) (see Cnossen (1996) for a discussion). These proposals are of interest since economic theory provides a
strong rationale for them.
The ACE, put forward by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991), boils down to a deduction on corporate profits equal
to the shareholders funds, multiplied by an appropriate nominal interest rate to be determined by the government.
As this tax deduction approximates the normal return to capital, the ACE approximates a tax on pure profits. This
is attractive for economic reasons since it does not distort marginal investment decisions.
The cash-flow tax, discussed for instance in Sinn (1987), allows immediate expensing of investments, while
scrapping the deductibility of interest payments. Since the present value of cash-flow equals the present value of
pure profits, the cash flow tax is, like the ACE, a tax on pure profits.
The CBIT, proposed by the US Department of the Treasury in 1992, taxes all capital income at the company level.
Hence, interest is no longer deductible from corporate profits. Accordingly, the CBIT does not favour debt finance
over equity finance so that thin capitalization becomes irrelevant.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation
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purely national corporations. Therefore, some have suggested to adopt such a harmonised tax
base for multinational corporations alone. Moreover, a proposal by the European employers
organization UNICE leaves the choice between a harmonised EU-tax base and the application of
national tax rules up to the multinational corporation (UNICE, 2000).
A major political obstacle to the harmonisation of tax bases is that any conceivable common
base will oppose vested interests in some member states. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a draft
proposal for harmonisation of the tax base by the European Commission (1988) never got
beyond its initial stages. 
Yet, there is a way out. If Germany accepts that taxable corporate income of Philips Germany
is calculated according to the Dutch tax code, and if the Netherlands accept that taxable
corporate income of Siemens Netherlands is calculated according to the German tax code, then
both Philips and Siemens are subject to only one tax code (albeit each to a different one), even
though neither Germany nor the Netherlands have to make administrative changes. This system
of mutual recognition -often called home state taxation- thus evades the political obstacle
mentioned above.
Common base and home state taxation may be complemented by formula apportionment.
This approach is an alternative to separate accounting with transfer prices.  Under separate
accounting, the profits of each business entity of a multinational group are cut off at the border
(the waters edge). Hence, the accounts of related business entities within the country can be
consolidated, but accounts with related business entities outside the country must be separated.
In contrast to this, formula apportionment assigns the sum of profits of all business entities that
comprise a multinational firm (the unitary combination) to the source countries on the basis of
a simple formula. The elements in the formula should reflect the factors that determine the
source of profits. Obvious candidates for the formula are workforce, capital layout, and sales.
Under formula apportionment with base sharing, countries can apply their own national tax
rates to the assigned share of profits. Formula apportionment is used in mature federations
such as the US and Canada. 
5.2.2 Harmonisation of tax rates
Profit shifting is driven by differences in statutory corporate income tax rates. The reason is that
depreciation allowances and other tax deductions depend on the capital outlay, not on corporate
income per se. Thus, harmonisation of corporate income tax rates curbs tax competition, even
without an accompanying harmonisation of tax bases. Harmonisation of statutory rates is,
however, a political nonstarter. Therefore, proposals typically refer to minimum tax rates.
Indeed, the European Commission has tried twice to agree on a minimum statutory rate in the
EU: in 1975 it proposed a range between 45 and 55%; in 1992 it suggested a minimum corporate
income tax rate of 30%. Individual member states brushed both proposals aside: they were
unwilling to give up the power to set their tax rate independently.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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An alternative to harmonisation of statutory tax rates is harmonisation of effective tax rates.
The minimum asset tax goes a long way towards this (Van Wijnbergen and Estache, 1999). It is
a simple broad based tax, with no or few tax preferences. Its most straightforward
implementation is to require corporations to compute their tax liability according to the
minimum asset tax as well as to the normal tax code, and let them pay whichever is highest
(hence the adjective minimum). An obvious choice for a broad base is a simplified definition of
corporate income. Some tax experts argue, however, that assets constitute a more reliable base
(hence the adjective asset).
In short, the minimum asset tax is a minimum effective tax rate: corporations cannot reduce
their corporate income tax bill to zero by exploiting tax preferences or shifting paper profits to
foreign subsidiaries; if the ratio of the corporate tax bill and the tax base falls below the
minimum asset tax rate, then the latter applies. Its main objective is to provide a backstop for
corporate income tax revenue. A computer simulation with real world data lead Van Wijnbergen
en Estache (1999) to  conclude that the minimum asset tax indeed does well on this score. Brasil
and Mexico, among other countries, operate variants of the minimum asset tax. 
5.2.3 Harmonisation of tax bases and rates
It goes without saying that harmonisation of tax bases and harmonisation of tax rates can be
combined. We focus on two prominent combinations: revenue sharing and the European
corporate income tax.
Revenue sharing is a variant of formula apportionment. It differs slightly from base sharing:
not the taxable corporate income per se, but the corporate income tax revenue is apportioned
according to a certain formula. This boils down to the system of formula apportionment
described above complemented by harmonisation of tax rates. It remains true that under either
system, the corporate tax base must be determined by either common base taxation or home
state taxation. The reason is that member states should in one way or another agree upon the
size of the cake before they can divide it.
From revenue sharing it is only one step towards a European corporate income tax. Under
such a system, the authority to tax corporate income is transferred from the individual member
states to the European Union. The revenue could then replace the individual member states
contributions to the Union.
The European corporate income tax finds support among prominent Europeans such
Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt. It merits special attention because it is the extreme
form of tax harmonisation, and is therefore politically orthogonal to the present situation which
is characterized by a virtual lack of coordination.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation
71
5.2.4 Summing up proposals for tax harmonisation
From the set of proposals for tax harmonisation outlined above, we will not discuss all  marginal
variations and suggestions. Instead, we focus on the following proposals that merely refer to
archetypical directions for tax harmonisation:
 common base taxation;
 common base taxation combined with formula apportionment;
 home state taxation combined with formula apportionment;
 harmonisation of statutory tax rates;
 minimum asset tax;
 formula apportionment with revenue sharing;
 European corporate income tax.
5.3 Criteria for the assessment of proposals
Four arguments recurrently crop up in the tax harmonisation debate: neutrality, the tax induced
distortion of international resource allocation; externality, the negative international spillover of
national tax policy; simplicity, the administrative and compliance costs; and diversity, the degree
to which national tax policy can provide for idiosyncratic national preferences with respect to, for
example, the mix of private and public goods.
5.3.1 Neutrality
Neutrality usually refers to the overall distortionary impact of capital tax systems on the
international resource allocation. This entails capital export neutrality, which requires residence
based taxation, or convergence of effective source-based tax rates.
Residence based taxation is difficult. Credits for taxes on foreign source profits would be a
step in the right direction. Nevertheless, excess credits and deferral of profit distribution would
maintain effective source based taxation (Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990). Thus, neutrality boils
down to convergence of effective tax rates. We operationalise the neutrality criterion by assessing
the impact of proposals on the variation of effective tax rates. Hence, if tax harmonisation
reduces this variation, it is said to improve neutrality.
5.3.2 Externality
The second criterion refers to the various international spillovers discussed in the previous
chapter. These market failures in the context of competition among governments originate in
strategic behaviour of governments. If tax harmonisation constitutes a binding restriction on the
freedom of governments to pursue this strategic behaviour, then the adverse welfare effects of
these externalities can be mitigated. Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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Externalities materialise in two forms: tax competition for paper profits, which puts
downward pressure on statutory tax rates; and externalities regarding real capital, which puts
downward pressure on effective tax rates. We treat these two forms of externalities separately.
This is, however, not to say that they are unrelated, on the contrary. Alleviating one externality
often exacerbates the other. For instance, if coordination restricts the freedom of governments to
compete with tax rates, governments may intensify tax competition with their tax bases. When
assessing the merits and demerits of the various proposals, we take these considerations into
account. 
As explained in the previous chapter, some degree of tax competition may be beneficial for
European welfare since it helps to alleviate government failures. Therefore, one should strike a
balance between tax coordination and tax competition. As the current situation is one of a virtual
lack of tax coordination, we assume that the EU has not yet reached this balance. Hence, we
assign a positive value to proposals that reduce the degree of tax competition. As chapter 4
reveals, this is probably more important for paper profits than it is for real capital.
5.3.3 Simplicity
Firms and governments face substantial administrative and compliance costs of corporate
income taxation. To illustrate, under separate accounting, multinationals have discretion over
the international allocation of joint costs such as research expenditures, advertising, and general
management. Tax authorities attempt to gain a foothold by applying the arms length principle.
The result is a cat and mouse game between multinationals and tax authorities: the first engage
in expensive tax planning in order to let paper profits precipitate in low tax countries without
breaking the transfer pricing rules; the latter engage in expensive monitoring of multinationals
accounting behaviour in order to enforce these rules and to receive a fair share of the tax base.
The cost of compliance are also high for businesses who face a complex set of tax rules and
regulations that vary country by country. For instance, countries adopt different  accounting
principles, use different definitions of income and expenses, and adopt different methods to
determine transfer prices.
These administrative and compliance costs tend to increase in the internationalisation of
business activity and the further development of the internal market. Furthermore,
developments such as internet and electronic commerce seem to complicate matters even
further (McLure, 2000).
5.3.4 Diversity
The subsidiarity principle in the EU stems from the idea that preserving the integrity of
sovereign states will best safeguard the welfare of European citizens. Only in the presence of
international spillovers can coordination or harmonisation be desirable. In the context of tax
policy, this implies that we should seek for tax coordination that allows for as much tax diversityAssessing proposals for tax harmonisation
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as possible. As Cnossen (1990) puts it ... tax diversity takes account of differences in
preferences for one tax over another in the various member states which reflect differences in
economic and social structures, different perceptions on the role of taxation, difference in the
acceptability and feasibility of various taxes and, perhaps more fundamentally, differences in
preferences for public sector size among the member states. Moreover, diversity allows real
world experiments with tax systems, which helps to adopt better practices. For these reasons,
the US, Canada, and Switzerland, among other federations, allow for substantial differences
among local tax systems. 
Diversity refers to distinct elements of taxation, including the level of tax rates, the definition
of tax bases, and tax administration. Diversity in tax rates and tax bases implies an unlevel
playing field that distorts the international allocation of resources, allows for strategic behaviour
of individual governments, and induces high administrative and compliance costs. Hence, it is
at odds with the neutrality, externality, as well as the simplicity criteria. In a sense, these reflect
the cost of tax diversity. An appropriate application of the subsidiarity principle would seek the
optimal trade-off between these costs and the benefits of tax diversity. We illustrate these and
other trade-offs in the next section.
5.4 The tax harmonisation policy matrix
In this section we confront the seven proposals for tax harmonisation with the four criteria. The
externality criterion is decomposed into tax competition for paper profits and real capital. Thus,
the heart of our assessment is a tax harmonisation policy matrix (see table 5.1) with seven rows,
each representing a proposal, and five columns, each representing a criterion. An element of the
matrix represents whether a proposal is likely to improve the tax system according to a particular
criterion.
The scoring itself merits clarification. First, all scores pertain to impacts relative to a
benchmark, which is dubbed laissez faire. This refers to the present situation, characterized by a
virtual lack of tax harmonisation. A zero score in the matrix signifies that a proposal has no
significant impact on a particular criterion, relative to the benchmark; a plus signifies that there
is an argument for a positive impact; a minus for a negative impact. Note that the strength of the
impact is undefined. In explaining the scores of the matrix, we will make some attempts to
provide a ranking of proposals on the various criteria, where possible.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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5.4.1 Neutrality
Which proposals have a positive impact on neutrality? In other words, which proposals aid
convergence of effective tax rates? The second column of Table 5.1 lists our scores.
Some believe that laissez faire will automatically induce convergence of effective tax rates:
just as price differentials are arbitraged away under perfect competition, tax rate differential are
arbitraged away under tax competition, so goes the argument. This belief is, however, not based
on mainstream tax competition theory. Indeed, Bucovetskys (1991) asymmetric outcome
discussed in chapter 4 falsifies the belief that capital market integration induces a spontaneous
convergence of capital income tax systems. Also different preferences or production
technologies will induce countries to set different tax rates (DePater and Myers, 1994). In any
event, since laissez faire is the benchmark, it scores zero by assumption.
A glance down the second column of table 5.1 reveals that all harmonisation proposals have a
positive impact upon neutrality. For some proposals this is not obvious. For instance, common
base taxation may increase the variation of effective tax rates because high statutory tax rates
tend to come with narrow bases and vice versa (see appendix).
In order to make an educated guess we ran simulations, measuring the impact of all
proposals on the variation of effective tax rates. Its results -presented in the appendix to this
chapter- show that variations decrease and thus that neutrality improves in all cases. More
specifically, neutrality improves most if tax bases and tax rates are both harmonised, as this
eliminates all variation in effective tax rates. Of the other proposals, harmonisation of tax bases
improves neutrality more than harmonisation of tax rates. The reason is that tax bases currently
vary more among countries than statutory tax rates. However, also a minimum effective tax rate
Table 5.13 The tax harmonisation policy matrix
Criteria    
Proposals Neutrality                        Externality Simplicity Diversity
Profits Real
Laissez faire (benchmark) 0 0 0 0 0
CB + 0 + + -
CB-FA + + +/- +/- -
HST-FA + + +/-- +/- -
STR + + +/- 0 -
MAT + + + - 0
FA-RS + + + +/- -
EU-CIT + + + + -
CB = common base taxation; CB-FA = common base taxation combined with formula apportionment; HST-FA = home state taxation combined
with formula apportionment; STR = harmonisation of statutory tax rates; MAT = minimum asset tax; FA-RS = formula apportionment combined
with revenue sharing; EU-CIT = European corporate income taxAssessing proposals for tax harmonisation
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and the harmonisation of statutory rates mildly improve the neutrality of capital income
taxation. 
5.4.2 Externality: the incentive to compete for paper profits
The third column of table 5.1 lists the scores for the externality with respect to paper profits. This
incentive should materialise in a reduction of statutory tax rates.
Common base taxation leaves the incentive to reduce statutory tax rates intact. In contrast,
formula apportionment makes profit shifting futile, which should annul the incentive (Mintz,
1998 and 1999). Multinationals retain, however, some discretion in manipulating their tax bill.
They can, for example, boost labour costs in any country by ascribing the burden of general
management to it. Accordingly, profit shifting is replaced by formula shifting. Although
formula apportionment thus does not annul, it will significantly diminish the incentive to
compete with statutory tax rates to attract paper profits.
The minimum asset tax puts a lower bound on statutory tax rates. Thus, also this proposal
does not annul, but diminishes the incentive to reduce statutory tax rates. Harmonisation of
statutory tax rates, either or not combined with a harmonisation of tax bases, score best on the
account of the first externality.
5.4.3 Externality: the incentive to compete for real capital
The fourth column of table 5.1 refers to the second externality: the incentive or possibility of
governments to compete for real capital. This incentive should materialise in a change in
effective tax rates, either by adjusting the tax base or by changing the statutory tax rate.
Common base taxation restricts all practices that affect the tax base focussed on attracting
particular kinds of business activity. It remains, however, possible to compete for  real capital by
setting low statutory tax rates across the board. Thus, common base taxation mildly diminishes
the incentive.
The impact of common base taxation combined with formula apportionment is ambiguous.
On the one hand -like common base taxation per se- it eliminates the opportunities to compete
for real capital through specific tax incentives in the tax base. On the other hand, it makes tax
competition in tax rates fiercer. This is because real investment decisions will be more
responsive to differences in effective tax rates now formula apportionment has made profit
shifting futile.
The same trade-off between the first and second externality applies to harmonisation of
statutory tax rates and home state taxation combined with formula apportionment: governments
have less instruments to pursue tax competition, but real investment decisions become more
responsive to differences in effective tax rates.
Home state taxation introduces an additional form of tax competition. Since multinationals
can reduce their tax bill by relocating their statutory headquarter to the member state with theAssessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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narrowest tax base, countries have an incentive to narrow their base, provided that there are
positive spillovers associated with hosting headquarters. Hence, home state taxation is likely to
intensify competition with tax bases.
The minimum asset tax, revenue sharing, and the European corporate income tax break the
trade-off between the first and second externality. The minimum asset tax puts a lower bound
on both statutory and effective tax rates; revenue sharing and the European corporate income tax
rigorously rule out tax competition for both paper profits and real capital.
5.4.4 Simplicity
The fifth column of table 5.1 lists whether proposals contribute to simplicity. Harmonisation of
statutory tax rates does not constitute a significant simplification. The minimum asset tax even
complicates matters due to the calculation of effective tax rates and retrospective tax collection.
Common base taxation is designed to alleviate the variation in the tax rules across countries
and, therefore, to reduce the administrative tax burden for multinationals. For the same reason,
common base taxation and home state taxation with formula apportionment improve simplicity
for companies. Taxation becomes, however, troublesome for tax administrations under formula
apportionment (McLure and Weiner, 2000). In order to receive an appropriate share of the
profits, countries rely on the appropriate enforcement and administration of fiscal authorities in
other countries. This calls for close cooperation between tax administrations. Moreover,
calculation of the variables in the formula is bound to be plagued by data problems. Finally,
formula apportionment raises technical problems such as defining which of the separately
incorporated affiliates should be included in a unitary business, and the treatment of different
accounting principles.
The European corporate income tax bypasses the complications of formula apportionment.
Moreover, there are scale effects in tax collection, e.g. due to uniformity of interpretation and
avoidance of duplication. This renders the European corporate income tax the most attractive
proposal in terms of simplicity.
5.4.5 Diversity
Unless a proposal has no impact upon government behaviour whatsoever, it must score
negatively on the diversity criterion. This is illustrated in the final column of table 5.1. There is,
however, a great deal of variation in the degree to which proposals infringe upon the freedom of
governments to choose tax systems.
Of all proposals, the minimum asset tax respects sovereignty most. It restricts neither the
diversity in tax bases nor the diversity in tax rates. It does put a lower bound on the effective tax
burden on companies. This is, however, not more severe than tax competition per se. Indeed,
under laissez faire, governments are restricted by tax competition: they must consider the
strategic response of other countries when deciding upon their own tax policy.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation
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Common base taxation infringes upon national sovereignty. Tax incentives have evolved
under pressure of different interest groups in different countries. Therefore, any conceivable
common base will oppose vested interests somewhere.
The same holds true for harmonisation of statutory tax rates. They primarily determine tax
revenue, which is at the heart of fiscal sovereignty. This is not to argue that the tax base is
immaterial, on the contrary. Idiosyncrasies of taxation are embedded in the array of tax
incentives that determine the base. Table A1 in the appendix to this chapter illustrates this point:
it shows that the variation of tax bases is higher than that of statutory tax rates.
Home state taxation merits special attention. At first glance, it appears to be compatible with
subsidiarity since it requires no changes to national tax systems, just mutual recognition. This
compatibility is, however, spurious. Subsidiaries of foreign parents are taxed according to the
base of the country that hosts the parent. Thus, member states effectively force their tax systems
upon each other without allowing each other to take part in deciding upon tax policy.
Furthermore, countries may be forced to engage in fiercer tax competition with respect to the
tax base in order to prevent headquarters from leaving the country. Thus, the surprising
conclusion must be that home state taxation is worse than common base taxation as far as
diversity is concerned.
Unsurprisingly, revenue sharing and the European corporate income tax most radically
infringe upon the sovereignty of member states. Under revenue sharing the responsibility for
tax administration remains with the member states; under the European corporate income tax,
this responsibility is shifted towards a centralised body.
5.5 Conclusion: assessing the cost of tax diversity
It is difficult to proclaim a winning proposal. For one thing, ranking the proposals according to
each criterion is not always possible. For another, even if it would be possible, there would be no
proposal scoring best on all criteria. This is due to the many trade-offs in taxation. 
The three proposals for tax base harmonisation -common base taxation and two variants of
formula apportionment- improve neutrality and simplicity, but come at a cost of tax diversity.
Moreover, a decrease of the incentive or possibility to compete for paper profits almost inevitably
implies an increase in the incentive to compete for real capital, and vice versa. Indeed, formula
apportionment only reduces the first externality, while common base taxation reduces only the
second.
The combination of common base taxation and formula apportionment outperforms the
combination of home state taxation and formula apportionment on the diversity criterion. In
particular, mutual recognition implies that foreign tax authorities decide upon the tax base of
hosted subsidiaries. Hence, each country is at the mercy of the countries hosting parent
companies. This implies that home state taxation is, as far as sovereignty is concerned, a wolf inAssessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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sheeps clothing. Moreover, it introduces a new form of tax competition: reducing tax bases in
order to attract parent companies.
Formula apportionment suffers from additional problems (see e.g. McLure and Weiner,
2000). It converts the corporate income tax to an effective tax on the arguments in the formula -
usually labour, capital outlay, and sales- thereby distorting their allocation. Moreover, the
formula is necessarily arbitrary, implying arduous political negotiations about exactly which
formula should apply. Obviously, member states that produce labour-intensively wish a heavy
weight for workforce; member states that produce capital-intensively wish a heavy weight for
capital layout. Anand and Sansing (2000) somewhat ironically refer to these negotiations as the
weighting game.
Harmonisation of statutory tax rates bypasses some of these problems. It scores positively on
neutrality and the externality with respect to paper profits. However, it does not improve
simplicity, diversity, nor does it break the trade-off between the two types of externality.
Among the proposals that respect diversity, solely the minimum effective tax rate improves
upon both the incentive to compete for paper profits and the incentive to compete for real
capital. For this reason, the minimum asset tax deserves more attention in the tax
harmonisation debate. Note, however, that it does increase the administrative burden of
taxation.
Full harmonisation of tax rates and bases outperforms all other proposals on neutrality,
externality, and simplicity. The shoe pinches, however, on the diversity criterion. These
proposals imply a one size fits all taxation, sidelining national tax authorities. Most member
states are unwilling to accept this, which makes the prospect for political approval bleak.
Comparing revenue sharing and the European corporate income tax, we conclude that the
latter outperforms the first. A uniform centralized tax administration yields economies of scale
in tax collection. Moreover, the European corporate income tax avoids political, technical and
economic problems associated with formula apportionment. A European corporate income tax
may also be a more natural source of finance for the EU budget than the current sources. After
all, the benefit principle suggests that the EU should tax multinationals who take advantage of
the internal market.
In short, there is a clear trade-off between diversity and all other criteria: improving
simplicity, for example, inevitably infringes upon the sovereignty of member states. Moreover,
there is a clear trade-off between the two types of externality: decreasing governments incentive
or possibility to compete for paper profits makes businesses more footloose, thereby increasing
governments incentive to compete for real capital. A third trade-off is between the complexity of
corporate taxes for companies and tax administrations: formula apportionment makes things
much simpler for multinational corporations but involves a plethora of complications for tax
administrations. Salient conclusions about individual proposals are that home state taxation -Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation
17 Note that the tax base indicator and the statutory tax rate are negatively correlated. In particular, the correlation
coefficient equals 0.3.
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contrary to what one would expect- does poorly on the diversity criterion, and that the minimum
asset tax is the only non-far-reaching proposal that breaks the externality trade-off. 
Appendix
To make an educated guess on the impact of the proposals for tax harmonisation on neutrality,
we did some simple calculations. These are reported in table 5.2. The first two columns of the
table list the statutory and effective corporate income tax rates of the member states in 1999.
The effective rates are derived as the mean effective tax rate of the corporations in the
Worldscope data base, calculated for each country (they are comparable to those derived from
table 2.4 where the median effective tax rates are reported). In table A1, the standard deviation of
the statutory and effective tax rates are, respectively 3.96 and 6.7. Dividing these standard
deviations by their respective mean values, we arrive at variation coefficients of 0.12 and 0.23,
respectively. The variation coefficient for the effective tax rate will be used to assess the
neutrality implications of the various proposals.
The third column of table A1 presents the ratio of the effective tax rate and the statutory tax
rate. This provides an indicative measure for the broadness of the tax base in each country.
Accordingly, we call it the tax base indicator. The mean value of the tax base indicator is equal to
0.87. This suggests that, on average, effective tax rates are lower than statutory tax rates in
Europe. The tax base indicator varies considerably across countries, from a low 0.52 for Belgium
to a high 1.11 for France. Although the indicator is probably an imperfect measure for the
broadness of the tax base in general, it does give a rough indication of the large differences
across EU-countries.
17
We explore the neutrality implications of various proposals in the next five columns of table
A1. In particular, in the fourth and fifth columns, we assume that under common base taxation
and the combination of common base taxation and formula apportionment, the tax base is
harmonised so that the tax base indicator for each county is equal to the European mean of 0.87.
Under this assumption, we calculate a new set of effective tax rates by taking the product of this
common tax base indicator and the statutory tax rate for each country (which is assumed not to
change). The new set of effective tax rates reveals that both proposals yield the same mean value
for the effective tax rate in Europe as in 1999. However, the variation coefficient drops to 0.12
which is equal to the variation coefficient of the statutory tax rates in Europe. As this variation
coefficient is smaller than for the current effective tax rates of 0.23 (see the second column of
table A1), both proposals improve the neutrality of the tax system by inducing convergence of
effective tax rates.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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Likewise, we simulate the impact of the combination of home state taxation and formula
apportionment on the effective tax rates in Europe (see the sixth column of table A1). Here, we
adopt an extreme assumption that all firms will locate their statutory headquarter in the
member state with the smallest base in order to minimise their EU-wide tax bill. Thus, we
substitute the Belgian tax base indicator of 0.52 for each other countrys tax base indicator, and
calculate a new set of effective tax rates by multiplying it with the appropriate statutory tax rates.
This yields a mean effective tax rate of 17.7, which is almost 12%-points lower than in 1999. The
variation coefficient, however, is equal to that under common base taxation (i.e. equal to the
variation coefficient of the statutory tax rates). Hence, home state taxation scores equally well on
the neutrality criterion.
The seventh column in table A1 computes the effective tax rates under a regime of
harmonised statutory tax rates at the European mean in 1999 of 34.1%. The tax base indicators
are assumed to maintain at their 1999 values. We see that the mean value of the effective tax
rates is equal to 1999, but that variation coefficient drops marginally from 0.23 to 0.22 (equal to
the variation coefficient of the tax base indicator). Hence, also the harmonisation of statutory tax
rates improves neutrality, albeit less than the harmonisation of the tax base (compare the
Table 5.14 Simulation of effective tax rates under different proposals
         situation in 1999          harmonisation tax base        harmonisation    
       tax rate
STR ETR TBI CB CB-FA HST-FA CSTR MINETR
Austria 34    21.7 0.64 29.7 29.7 17.7 21.7 26.2
Belgium 39    20.3 0.52 34.1 34.1 20.3 17.7 28.3
Denmark 32    28.1 0.88 28.0 28.0 16.7 30.0 30.2
Finland 28    28.2 1.01 24.5 24.5 14.6 34.3 29.9
France 33.3 37.0 1.11 29.1 29.1 17.3 37.9 37.9
Germany 40    41.9 1.05 35.0 35.0 20.8 35.7 43.8
UK 30    32.5 1.08 26.2 26.2 15.6 36.9 34.9
Greece 40    35.2 0.88 35.0 35.0 20.8 30.0 36.6
Ireland 32    21.1 0.66 28.0 28.0 16.7 22.4 25.1
Italy 37    38.3 1.04 32.3 32.3 19.3 35.3 39.5
Netherlands 35    27.5 0.78 30.6 30.6 18.2 26.7 30.6
Portugal 34    27.9 0.82 29.7 29.7 17.7 28.0 33.2
Spain 35    25.1 0.72 30.6 30.6 18.2 24.4 27.8
Sweden 28    29.6 1.06 24.5 24.5 14.6 36.1 32.3
mean 34.1 29.6 0.87 29.8 29.8 17.7 29.8 32.6
standard deviation 3.96 6.70 0.19 3.50 3.50 2.10 6.50 5.40
variation coefficient 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.17
STR = statutory tax rate; ETR = effective tax rate; TBI = tax base indicator; CB = common base taxation; CB-FA = common base taxation
combined with formula apportionment; HST-FA = home state taxation combined with formula apportionment; CSTR = common statutory tax
rate; MINETR = minimum effective tax rate.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation
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variation coefficient under harmonisation of statutory tax rates with that under common base
and home state taxation). 
The final column of table A1 simulates the impact of the minimum effective tax on
neutrality. We did this experiment as follows. The implied minimum effective tax rate for each
individual firm is assumed to be the minimum effective tax rate in Europe in 1999, i.e. the
Belgian rate of 20.3%. Subsequently, we used the Worldscope database of 6000 companies in
Europe and compare the reported tax rate of a company with the minimum tax rate of 20.3%.
For companies that report a tax rate below 20.3%, we change the tax rate to this minimum level.
For all other companies, we do not change the effective tax rate. With this alternative set of tax
rates for companies, we calculate a new set of mean effective tax rates for all countries. The final
column of table A1 reveals that the mean effective tax rate rises in all countries, most notably in
low-tax countries such as Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal. The European mean rises by
3%-points. However, the variation coefficient declines from 0.23 without a minimum rate, to
0.17 with the minimum effective tax rate of 20.3%. Hence, this proposal scores positively on the
neutrality criterion. More specifically, neutrality improves more than under a harmonisation of
the statutory tax rate, but less than under a harmonisation of the tax base.
For revenue sharing and the European corporate income tax, the outcome for neutrality is
obvious: as both tax bases and tax rates are harmonised, all effective rates are equal. Thus, the
variation of effective tax rates reduce to zero. These proposals score best on the neutrality
criterion.Assessing proposals for tax harmonisation Capital income taxation in Europe
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6 Options for reform
Internationalisation is an ongoing process. It is characterized by increasing capital mobility, a
growing importance of multinational enterprises, and more cross-ownership relationships
across countries. This puts pressure on uncoordinated company tax systems. What would be a
desirable policy response to the trend of internationalisation?
6.1 The case for tax coordination
We conclude that the case for tax coordination is rather subtle. On the one hand, tax
coordination entails a number of benefits. It can reduce compliance and enforcement costs
which are high due to fifteen distinct tax codes within the EU. Moreover, tax coordination can be
a viable backstop to the fiscal externalities associated with tax competition. Empirical evidence
indeed suggests that tax competition is important: statutory tax rates are declining which
suggests tax competition for paper profits; preferential tax regimes abound in various EU
member states; and governments strategically respond to each others tax setting behaviour. On
the other hand, however, tax competition may be a welcome disciplinary device for reducing
government failures. Moreover, infringement on national tax sovereignty may reduce welfare to
the extent that countries can no longer pursue the policies that best reflect the preferences of
their citizens. As from the empirical side, effective tax rates have remained constant during the
last decade, suggesting that tax competition for real capital is virtually absent.
Hence, the optimal design of company taxation in Europe is likely to be neither a complete
absence of coordination, nor a complete harmonisation. Indeed, the challenge for Europe is to
find intermediate forms of tax coordination that strike a balance between the costs and benefits
of tax coordination. Proposals of this kind are, among others, harmonisation of the tax base,
formula apportionment with base sharing, a minimum statutory tax rate, and a minimum
effective tax rate. When assessing the merits and demerits of these proposals, one faces several
additional trade-offs. For instance, proposals that focus on reducing the opportunities for profit
shifting, hardly reduce tax competition for real capital and vice versa. Moreover, reducing the
complexity of corporate taxes for companies under formula apportionment involves a plethora
of complications for tax administrations. Furthermore, the welfare effects of tax coordination are
typically unevenly distributed: large countries tend to gain more than small countries, if the
latter gain at all.  Smaller countries are thus unlikely to press hard for tax coordination, unless a
package deal makes it attractive for small and large countries alike.Options for reform Capital income taxation in Europe
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6.2 The case for national tax reform
For the Netherlands, there is a case for a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate. The mean
statutory rate in the EU has fallen five percentage points and will fall even further if member
states press on with their announced tax cuts. The Dutch rate has remained constant over the
last ten years, and has now become relatively high. If the Netherlands does not respond, then tax
arbitrage with respect to paper profits -- which is found to be an important phenomenon -- will
precipitate elsewhere.
Although effective tax rates on companies have remained constant in the EU, there is also a
case for a lower average corporate tax burden. Indeed, this parameter has a significant impact on
the location of foreign investments. The statutory rate does not play an independent role for
location decisions. Internationalisation tends to boost the gains from a lower effective tax
burden on corporations since it makes real capital more mobile, especially in the long run. A
lower tax burden on companies, however, involves a cost in terms of public revenue and
provides a windfall gain to foreign investors that reap location-specific rents.
This prompts to the combination of a lower statutory rate, combined with a broadening of
the tax base, e.g. by scrapping accelerated depreciation, alleviating tax incentives, or reducing the
tax deductibility of interest on the corporate level. Base broadening cum rate reduction is what
actually occurred in most EU countries during the last decade and which was a leading principle
in the recent reforms in Dutch labour income taxation. An additional benefit from this policy is
that it would make the tax system more neutral in its treatment of debt and equity, thereby
reducing the incentives for thin capitalization. 
The problem with base broadening cum rate reduction is that it inevitably redistributes the
corporate tax burden across industries: some sectors suffer more than others from a broadening
of the tax base. Moreover, somewhat paradoxically, base broadening cum rate reduction will
raise the marginal effective tax rate on capital. This is because, in contrast to tax-base allowances,
the statutory corporate tax rate applies to extraordinary profits. The higher marginal effective tax
rate will raise the user cost of capital, thereby discouraging domestic capital formation. To
mitigate these problems, a reduction in the average company tax burden might be desirable.
6.3 The choice between tax coordination and national tax reform
In short, national reform in company taxation enhances the attractiveness of a country as a
location for industries. And if all countries do so, it may yield a better investment climate in
entire Europe. However, what makes the case for national tax reform also makes the case for tax
coordination. Indeed, national reform typically reflects a strategic response of governments who
engage in tax competition. As we have argued, this causes adverse external effects on other
countries. Therefore, a prolonged sequence of national tax reforms under tax competition isOptions for reform
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probably a sub-optimal response to internationalisation. Coordination is therefore desirable.
How countries go about coordinating their tax systems is a matter of political priorities that
cannot be determined by economists alone. Indeed, we have stressed a number of trade-offs that
lie at the heart of the debate on tax coordination. Given recent trends in capital income tax
systems, it seems most obvious to focus on putting an end to profit shifting and reducing the
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